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Ownership of the large public corporation in Germany and Japan differs
markedly from that in the United States. Here, senior managers hold the reins
of power; scattered individuals and institutions own the stock. American
financial intermediaries only recently have begun to project power into
corporate boardrooms; they have historically been dispersed, weak, and
uninterested. In the German and Japanese large firm, in contrast, senior
managers must share power with active intermediaries wielding the votes of
large blocks of stock.
Corporate Structure
These differences and the different law, history, and politics that helped
produce them cast doubt on current thinking about the origin of the large
American public firm. True, firms had to tap vast pools of capital to reach
economies of scale and, as shareholders diversified, scattered ownership shifted
power to managers. While this is the dominant economic paradigm, it omits
a critical step: American shareholders could have diversified through powerful
intermediaries, but they did not. Corporate functions could have become further
specialized, with strong intermediaries sharing governance functions with
managers, but they did not. Had such intermediaries developed in the United
States, a flatter structure of shared power could have developed in the large
American firm, as it did in Germany and Japan. Elsewhere I have argued that
one must look beyond economics to explain the American results: America's
politics of financial fragmentation, rooted in federalism, populism, and interest
group pressures, pulverized American financial institutions, contributing
heavily to the rise of the Berle-Means corporation.'
In Part I of this Article, I argue that even a brief comparison of corporate
ownership structures between Germany and Japan on the one hand, and the
United States on the other, poses problems for prevailing academic theories.
The classical economic explanation for the public firm emphasizes scale
economies, shareholder diversification, and the divergence of managerial goals
from stockholder goals. The economic explanation would, if it were universal,
tend to predict that nations with similar economies would have similar
corporate structures. There is a best way to make steel, and presumably there
is a best way to organize large steel firms. Thus, managerial incentive
compensation schemes, proxy fights, conglomerates, takeovers, and boards of
independent outsiders, all of which reduce (or reflect) the costs of organizing
the large American public firm, should play a role in corporate governance in
all three nations. At a minimum, the absence of these features in the flatter,
shared authority structure prevalent in Germany and Japan poses a challenge,
because it shows that there is more than one way to deal with the large firm's
organizational problems. And the differences in corporate structure suggest that
differing political histories, cultures, and paths of economic development must
be added to the economic model to explain the differing structures. The
economic model must be down-sized and considered to be the special case that
arises if intermediaries are fragmented.
The classical economic model does not account for the German and
Japanese corporate structure, whose basic features I present in Part II. Large
financial intermediaries, usually banks, hold concentrated blocks of stock in
many foreign firms, including the very largest. Bankers and managers interact
1. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUm. L. REv. 10 (1991)
[hereinafter Roe, Political Theory]; Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control
of Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 7 (1990).
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in structured settings, where power has been shared between firms and
financiers, unlike in the United States, where the chief executive officer has
historically controlled the firm from the top of a hierarchy, without significant
accountability to financial intermediaries.
Comparison allows us to test the hypothesis that law and the politics that
underlie it help determine corporate structure. If U.S. firms could readily adopt
the German or Japanese structure under U.S. law, we would have a partial
contradiction of the law and politics hypothesis. In fact, several laws bar U.S.
banks from involvement in the governance of American firms. Most critically,
the foreign banks have a national reach that would violate the McFadden Act;
they are relatively much larger than U.S. banks, giving them the size needed
to control large slices of large firms' capital structure. The Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, as usually interpreted, requires U.S. banks to be
passive, but the foreign banks are not passive. The Glass-Steagall Act limits
American banks' securities business.
German national banks enter boardrooms by combining votes from stock
they own directly, stock in bank-controlled investment companies, and
securities they vote for their brokerage customers. Combining banks, mutual
funds, ahd brokers in this way would violate the McFadden Act, the Glass-
Steagall Act, and the Bank Holding Company Act. Japanese banks are also
active in corporate governance through truly national banks and, even though
Japan has a Glass-Steagall Act (imposed by America after World War I) to
separate commercial banks from investment banks, Japanese regulators
effectively repealed it by forcing savings and corporate financing into Japanese
banks.
These laws, necessary to fully understanding the American public firm,
have been the San Andreas fault line in American corporate governance,
historically severing America's largest financial institutions from its largest
industrial firms. While we'll never know whether American-style fragmentation
would have developed in the absence of legal roadblocks, American law would
have been sufficient to block both German- and Japanese-style financial
institutions from developing here.
In Part III, I examine whether the differences in corporate structure are
only temporary because financial institutions in Germany and Japan are
"behind" America and evolving without political pressure to resemble
American institutions. There are contrary trends abroad-some point toward
less concentration and less institutional voice, some point to more voice or to
stability. And there are weak trends toward greater concentration and
institutional voice here in the United States. The mixed facts indicate financial
evolution is uneven; we are evolving to look (a little) like them and they are
evolving to look (a little) like us.
Even if foreign financial institutions clearly were fragmenting and
American institutions were concentrating, doubts about current corporate
1930 [Vol. 102: 1927
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theories would persist. Foreign politics could have induced the foreign
evolution. In Part IV, we see that today's foreign structures depend partly on
the path they took from the foreign statist past, which militated toward
financial concentration. Today political forces not all that different from those
in America's past are weakening the intermediaries. In Germany, persistent
popular pressure has led to Parliamentary proposals to reduce the power of
banks over industrial stock. In Japan, efforts to transform credit-based financial
power, which is weakening, to stock-based boardroom power, have not been
fully successful yet, because the laws left by the post-World War II American
occupation preclude such a transformation, and interest group conflict-mostly
between bankers and brokers-tends to support the status quo. To transform
their financial system, the Japanese must dismantle the American framework.
They are beginning to do so, but they may fail.
In Part V, I analyze the common elements in the German and Japanese
structural patterns and compare them to the U.S. structure in order to find
theoretical explanations for their survival despite their obvious weaknesses.
Institutional ownership discourages entrepreneurial leadership, risks conflicts
of interest, and may make adaption to change more difficult. Moreover, agency
problems may simply shift from the firm to the intermediary. Although a
simple inquiry might try to find the better corporate structure and anoint it the
preferred candidate, complications afflict such an inquiry. First, there isn't
much evidence that the foreign structures contribute greatly to better
performance. Second, a legal inquiry differs from an economic one. As long
as institutional engagement in corporate governance advantages some firms, we
have reason to regret some of our restrictions. Finding some value in the
foreign structures, however, does not mean we should require them here;
absent spillover effects, we should only allow firms that want them to adopt
them. Third, even if we came to regret our restrictions, we might not
necessarily demand their repeal or predict that their repeal would lead to rapid
restructuring, because the path-dependent development of American financial
institutions and corporate structures impedes change. Fourth, it might turn out
that neither the American fragmentation nor foreign concentration is optimal,
or it might turn out that any foreign successes are culturally dependent or
embedded in institutions (like labor relations or the regulatory system) that are
impossible to import. The comparative inquiry may just show that there are
more possibilities than the American one. Fifth, product market competition
in an internationalized economy is the best self-corrective. Whatever the source
of the recent success of foreign firms-and I suspect corporate structure is
tertiary-competition induces American firms to perform better.
What are the possible foreign strengths? Although a corporate law
academic's first inquiry would likely be to see if the German and Japanese
corporate structure controls managerial agency costs well, the competitive
advantage of the foreign structure may lie not just in reducing what we think
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of as agency costs, but in (1) changing the environment of
decisiorlmaking-bringing more individuals and organizations to the table
when technologies and markets are changing too rapidly for a single CEO or
a single firm to stay current; (2) improving the information flow to large
stockholders in ways that a fragmented securities market cannot achieve; or (3)
improving organizational performance by facilitating relation-specific
investments without using a stultifying, large vertical organization and by
providing a matrix for decisionmaking across related organizations. Even if
future research shows none of these hypotheses about Germany and Japan to
be true, or shows that the advantages of the true hypotheses are offset by their
disadvantages, the study of the differences in corporate structure is worthwhile
because it illustrates that the current American arrangements are not inevitable,
but instead are highly dependent on the organization of financial
intermediaries. We may never want to import foreign features, but once we see
that corporate structure is variable, we may be more willing to reexamine our
own system.
In Part VI, we see that in reexamining our system, we should not allow
Germany and Japan to become blueprints for American financial institutions.
The organization of banks is too important to be driven by debatable corporate
governance concerns. Nor is it clear that legal change would induce structural
change. The gains, if any, from change may be small and might fail to exceed
the transaction costs of any change. Complex institutions are shaped by their
own history, including their regulatory history; legal permission may not lead
institutions to take the newly-opened opportunities, at least not immediately.
Moreover, CEO's are embedded in several markets and organizational features
beyond corporate governance relations with institutional shareholders. These
other markets and organizational features may be strong enough to render any
gains from corporate change small.
Finally, I conclude this review of corporate structures with a simple claim:
How a nation organizes its financial institutions deeply determines its large
firm corporate ownership structure. In America, a deep gap separates finance
and industry; in Germany and Japan such a fault line does not yet fully
separate intermediaries from managers. Neither ownership fragmentation due
to scale economies nor the economic model can explain enough of the
structural differences. Corporate ownership structure is highly sensitive to the
organization of financial intermediaries, which in turn is highly sensitive to
popular attitudes toward financial concentration and political fights.
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I. THE CLASSICAL ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE PUBLIC FIRM
Since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published The Modem Corporation
and Private Property2 in 1932, American corporate law academics' central
task has been to understand the separation of ownership from control in the
large American corporation. In the standard story, the rise of large-scale
production technologies at the end of the nineteenth century demanded huge
inputs of capital that could only be raised from far-flung investors who,
demanding diversification and liquidity, were only able to buy small pieces of
a firm's equity. Small holders distant from the enterprise lacked the
information, skill, and incentive to monitor managers, who became relatively
free from shareholder oversight.
This unwieldy structure yielded agency costs, described in the modem
reformulation as the sum of (1) bonding costs, as managers tried to assure that
they would do a good job; (2) monitoring costs, as shareholders tried to
oversee managers; and (3) a residual loss that could not be eliminated.
3
Corporate law scholarship sought to understand these costs, to explain features
of the firm as either aligning managers' interests with those of shareholders or
as the residuum of unavoidable loss, and to recommend ways to further reduce
these costs. In equilibrium, there would be no further costs to eliminate. Any
observed costs would be either the bonding or monitoring costs, whose
elimination would cost more in increased residual loss, or the residual loss,
whose elimination would cost more in offsetting bonding or monitoring costs.
Corporate academics sought to perfect the independent director, who is not
beholden to management. Other means to minimize agency costs have included
managerial labor markets, incentive compensation tied to stock price, capital
markets that denied bad managers access to capital, and high debt that
heightened fear of bankruptcy. Conglomerates in their ideal form centralized
information and checked managers;4 in their pathological form, they built
empires. In contractarian corporate thought, corporate law was a contract to
minimize agency costs. State corporate law provided a standard form for most
firms and allowed the remaining ones to tailor the contract to their specific
situations.5  Finally, some financial theorists explained shareholder
powerlessness as efficient; stockholders should not influence firm decisions
because their specialty was bearing risk, not decisionmaking.
6
2. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
3. The 1970's state-of-the-art was Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
4. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
155-75 (1975).
5. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
34-35 (1991).
6. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
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By the 1980's, however, agency theorists were unsure whether America
had achieved a long-run equilibrium in corporate structure in which the further
reduction of agency costs had become unimportant. Many scholars argued that
takeovers cured large, residual agency costs because managers who deviated
too much from shareholders' interests risked a hostile takeover. Skeptics
viewed some takeovers as resulting from the agency costs of errant managers
expanding their empires, but others argued that even these costs would be
eliminated in another wave of takeovers that would break up the empires.7
Regardless of whether takeovers cured or exacerbated agency problems, many
corporate law scholars viewed agency cost explanations as central to
understanding the American corporation.8
Our classical economic model would imply that large firms in every
economy would face similar problems. The organization of large-scale industry
in the United States generated agency problems and solutions; large-scale
industry elsewhere should tend to develop the same organization, problems,
and solutions. As foreign industry "caught up" with American industry,
economies of scale would require huge inputs of capital from far-flung
investors who would let power shift to managers, leading to a similar
fragmented ownership, afflicted with similar managerial agency costs. The
alternatives to this prediction might be too horrible for corporate law scholars
to imagine. Corporate structure might not matter. Or, different governance
systems might yield different advantages and disadvantages, making it difficult
for one system to dominate the other. Or, each system might be efficient in its
own national context, indicating that there are several equally efficient ways
to organize large-scale industry. Or, the U.S. governance system may have
arisen and survived because U.S. laws and politics suppressed the obvious
alternatives to the Berle-Means corporation.
The differences in corporate structure seem to contradict the classical
economic model, at least in its most simple form. Elsewhere I have advanced
an additional hypothesis to explain the development of the large public firm
in America.9 There is more than one way to move savings from households
to industry. A securities market that produces fragmented ownership is only
one way, and it is the prevailing way in America. But, funds could also move
7. Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 627-28 (1989).
8. For overviews of the agency theory literature, see Michael C. Jensen & Clifford W. Smith,
Stockholder Manager and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory, in RECENT ADVANCES IN
CORPORATE FINANCE 93 (Edward I. Altman & Marti G. Subrahmanyam eds., 1985) and Clifford W. Smith,
Agency Costs, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: FINANCE (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989).
9. Roe, Political Theory, supra note 1. For related discussions, see WILLIAM G. OUCHI, THE M-FORM
SOCIETY: How AMERICA CAN RECAPTURE THE COMPETITIVE EDGE 82-90 (1984); LESTER C. THUROW,
THE ZERO SUM SOLUTION 164-65 (1985); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 520 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of
American Capital, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 89 (1990); Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation,
HARV. BUs. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61.
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from households to firms through large, powerful financial intermediaries that
control big blocks of stock in industry while providing their investors with
diversification and liquidity. Such powerful institutional intermediaries are
more important abroad than in America. Quite a bit of evidence indicates that
American politics deliberately fragmented financial institutions, their portfolios,
and their ability to aggregate stock into influential voting blocks. Thus, we
may hypothesize that if American political history had taken a different path,
financial intermediaries might have played a different role in the American
economy, and the structure of authority in the large public firm might also be
different.
We cannot go back to 1890 and re-run American history without the
politics of financial fragmentation to see whether American financial
intermediaries and firms develop differently. We can, however, search abroad
for different foreign governance structures and see whether the differences
correlate with differences in financial regulation. In fact, the history of foreign
financial regulation differs from the American experience, supporting the
hypothesis that the politics of financial intermediation is a key determinant of
corporate structure. The economic model cannot alone explain foreign
structures and their differences with the American structures; it needs a
political theory of American corporate finance to provide an adequate
explanation.
The contractarian version of the classical economic says corporate law is
a standard contract that shareholders and managers would adopt if they could
cheaply bargain over their relationship with the firm; or, in its normative form,
the contractarian version asserts that corporate law should conform to the
contract that parties would tend to negotiate. By focusing on state corporate
law, particularly Delaware corporate law and the ordering among shareholders,
boards of directors, and managers, we American corporate law scholars have
overlooked key laws that limit financial intermediaries' ability to control large
blocks of stock and to become involved in corporate governance. To co-opt the
political critique, proponents of the contractarian model must concede that
important mandatory rules are found, perhaps not in state corporate law, but
in the rules dictating the organization of financial intermediaries and their
relationship with large firms. They can then energize the normative form of the
economic model and criticize mandatory rules if the rules bar useful contracts.
The foreign differences thus cast doubt on the standard American
evolutionary paradigm-that corporate ownership mediated through securities
markets is the highest form of financial development, successfully providing
ownership, diversification, and liquidity in just the right proportions. If we
believed that financial fragmentation is economically (as opposed to politically)
inevitable then the economic model could survive as the sole explanation for
corporate structures. But the persistence thus far of differences in foreign
ownership structures suggests not only that more that one evolutionary path
19351993]
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exists, but also that the recent increase in American institutional investors'
corporate governance activity is probably the delayed result of our historical
suppression of strong intermediaries.
The point here is not to displace the part of the economic model that
explains the role of technology, economies of scale, and far-flung investors.
Rather, the goal is to displace the next step in the model's reasoning-that
these features must give rise to fragmented ownership, with distant
shareholders and powerful managers. The classical economic model can stand,
but only if down-sized to a local equilibrium arising when financial institutions
are fragmented. If a nation does not fragment its financial institutions, or if a
nation designs other means of corporate governance-by privileging labor, or
managers, or one financial institution or another, for example-then different
organizational structures may emerge. How a nation regulates capital's
deployment will affect how firms are organized. The history of American
financial fragmentation, the foreign systems, and the modest contemporary
concentration of American institutional ownership all indicate not only that
there is more than one way to move capital into large firms, but also that the
American-style public corporation is more a local custom than the result of an
inevitable economic evolution.
II. GERMAN AND JAPANESE INFLUENCE THROUGH STOCKHOLDING:
SHARED CONTROL AND A FLATrER AUTHORITY STRUCTURE
Differences in the ownership of large firms in Germany and Japan, on the
one hand, and those in the United States, on the other, are startling. Stock in
large German and Japanese firms is held in big voting blocks; frequently a
handful of institutional shareholders votes 20% of a firm's stock. In America,
in contrast, even after the concentration and institutionalization of recent years,
the largest five shareholders rarely together control as much as 5% of a large
firm's stock. Despite significant legal differences between Germany and Japan,
both nations have ownership structures that provide for a sharing of power so
that no person or institution has complete control. The U.S. structure of
corporate ownership focuses power in management, especially in the chief
executive officer.
A. Large Firms and Large Voting Blocks
In both Germany and Japan, but not in America, the typical large firm's
stock is held in concentrated voting blocks. CEO's of the ten largest German
firms usually face two or three big institutional blocks, each controlling 10%
of the vote; CEO's of the ten largest American firms face no such big
institutional blocks. CEO's at many large German companies face a small
group of institutional voting blocks that controls nearly half of the stock voted;
1936 [Vol. 102: 1927
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the equivalent figure in the United States is only 5%. Table I presents the
voting blocks for typical large German firms; Table II presents GM's
ownership structure, which is typical for the large American firm,'" as well
as the voting structures for the largest automakers in Germany and Japan.
TABLE I. Aggregate Voting Blocks of Largest
Three German Banks (1986)"
Rank and Name Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of Total Percent
of Company Shares Shares Shares Shares of Shares
Voted at Held by Held by Held by Held by
Meeting Deutsche Dresdner Commerz Three Largest
Bank Bank bank Banks
1. Siemens 60.64 17.64 10.74 4.14 32.52
2. Daimler-Benz 81.02 41.80 18.78 1.07 61.66
3. Volkswagen 50.13 2.94 3.70 1.33 7.98
4. Bayer 53.18 30.82 16.91 6.77 54.50
5. BASF 55.40 28.07 17.43 6.18 51.68
6. Hoechst 57.73 14.79 16.92 31.60 63.48
9. VEBA 50.24 19.99 23.08 5.85 48.92
10. Table XIII shows similar structures for other large American firms. For a complete breakdown of
institutional ownership for the largest 10 American firms, see Carolyn Kay Brancato et al., Institutional
Investor Concentration of Economic Power: A Study of Institutional Holdings and Voting Authority in U.S.
Publicly Held Corporations app. 2 (Sept. 12, 1991) (unpublished study, on file with author).
11. Source: Amo Gottschalk, Der Stimmrechtseinfluss der Banken in den Aktiondirsversammlungen der
Grossunternehmen, 5 WSI-MrIrEILUNGEN 294, 298 (1988). Although Gottschalk's data-from 1986-is
not current, it is the most recent data available. This table combines the German banks' votes from
brokerage stock, directly-owned stock, and, apparently, mutual fund stock.
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TABLE I. Top Five Institutional Voting Blocks in GM, Daimler-Benz, and
Toyota1
2
Daimler-Benz Toyota General Motors
Institutional Percent of Institutional Percent of Institutional Percent of
Manager Shares Manager Shares Manager Shares
Deutsche Bank 41.80 Sakura Bank 4.9 Mich. St. Treas. 1.42
Dresdner Bank 18.78 Sanwa Bank 4.9 Bernstein Stanford 1.28
Commerzbank 12.24 Tokai Bank 4.9 Wells Fargo 1.20
Sonst. Kredit 4.41 Nippon Life 3.8 CREF 0.96
Bayerische L-Bank 1.16 Long-Term Cred. Bk. 3.1 Bankers Trust NY 0.88
Top 5 Shareholders 78.39 21.6 5.74
Top 25 Shareholders N.A. N.A. 13.93
German bankers' voting power comes from direct ownership of stock,
from control over investment companies, and, most importantly, from authority
to vote stock that the bank's brokerage customers own but deposit with the
bank. Although the German banks do not own a large amount of stock directly
for their own benefit, when they deploy their capital in stock ownership, they
deploy it in big blocks. As Table VIII in the Appendix shows, in the one
hundred largest German industrial enterprises, banks directly own for their own
accounts twenty-two blocks of at least 5% of the outstanding stock. Banks also
vote the small one or two percent blocks owned by bank-sponsored investment
companies.' 3 Finally, banks vote the brokerage stock they hold as custodian.
Typically, individual investors deposit the stock they own with their bank, and,
unless the owner gives the bank special instructions, the bank votes the
custodial shares. German banks often hold as custodian and vote more than
10% of the stock of a large company. 4
How does the ability to vote large blocks of stock, some of which the bank
owns for itself and most of which it holds as custodian, allow the bank to
12. Source: CDA Investment Technologies, 13(0 Institutional Portfolios, Spectrum Institutional
Portfolios (database for year-end 1990 GM data, assembled by Riverside Economic Associates); Gottschalk,
supra 11, at 298 (data for Daimler-Benz' voting blocks at 1986 shareholders' meeting); JAPAN COMPANY
HANDBOOK 790 (T6y6 Keizai Inc., 1992) (data for Toyota's voting blocks). The GM and Toyota data are
typical for the very largest American and Japanese firms. Daimler-Benz' largest vote holder is atypically
large, due to Deutsche Banks' atypically large block of stock that it owns for the bank's own account. The
Daimler-Benz data is based on votes actually cast at the 1986 shareholders' meeting; GM and Toyota data
are based on stock owned with full voting authority, irrespective of whether the holder voted the stock. The
GM data is from 1990, Daimler-Benz from 1986, and Toyota from 1992.
13. Gottschalk, supra note I1, at 295.
14. Compare Table I and Gottschalk, supra note 11, with Table VIII; see also Detlev F. Vagts,
Reforming the "Modem" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23,53-58 (1966);
Hermann H. Kallfass, The American Corporation and the Institutional Investor: Are There Lessons From
Abroad?, 3 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 775, 782-83 (1988).
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influence the firm? In the large German firm, stockholders elect half of the
supervisory board, employees appoint the other half' 5 The supervisory board
appoints a management board and approves major corporate decisions; the
management board handles day-to-day decisions. German bankers use their
votes to elect bank nominees to the supervisory boards of ninety-six of the one
hundred largest German firms, and in fourteen cases, a banker chairs the
supervisory board.' 6 Although no single bank generally controls an industrial
firm (Deutsche Bank's control of Daimler-Benz is exceptional), together the
three German large banks can, if they act in unison, dominate the shareholding
side of the supervisory board.'
7
To an American observer, this control over large voting blocks, rather than
control over credit, is the biggest difference between the German and the
American structure. 8 Although bank loans helped create close relationships
between bankers and managers, the importance of the "house bank" debtor-
creditor relationship has faded,' 9 and German firms no longer rely on a single
bank for credit. German banks control the proxy system, not monopolistic
sources of credit.
The ownership of large firms in Japan is roughly analogous to that in
Germany. Large Japanese firms typically belong to a keiretsu, a group of firms
and intermediaries that own some of each others' stock, usually aggregating
to ownership of half of each other's stock.20 A main bank owns 5% of the
stock of the keiretsu's industrial firms, which in turn own some stock in the
main bank. Generally, four other banks and insurers own blocks of stock in the
industrial firms, roughly equal to 5% of the outstanding shares, thus creating
a latent five-holder coalition with 20% of the outstanding stock. Japanese large
firms show a persistent pattern of concentrated ownership for the past twenty-
five years, as Table III shows, a pattern of concentration that prevails, not just
for small or mid-sized firms, but for Japan's very largest-Toyota, Nissan,
Matsushita, and Mitsubishi. In America, in contrast, the five largest holders in
15. Some employee members represent white collar workers, some represent blue collar workers, and
some are union representatives.
16. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, ACHTEs HAUPTGUTACHTEN DER MONOPOLKOMMISSION, DRUCKSACHE
11/7582, 11. Wahlperiode 202-06 (July 16, 1990) (investigative report by Monopoly Commission of
German Parliament); see also THEODOR BAUMS, BANKS AND CORPORATE CONTROL 29-30 (Berkeley Law
and Economics Working Paper No. 91-1, 1991).
17. Although Deutsche Bank is the largest bank, Commerzbank and Dresdner together have roughly
the same number of votes.
18. True, German bankers do sit on some boards where they lack votes, as do American bankers. The
contrast with the American system is not here, but in the many firms where a German banker votes 15%
or more of the stock of a firm on whose board a bank employee sits. If American institutions controlled
such big blocks of stock, they would also sit on the board and be taken seriously by senior managers.
19. See BAUMS, supra note 16, at 9.
20. Michael L. Gerlach, Keiretsu Organization in the Japanese Economy, in POLITICS AND
PRODUCTIVITY: THE REAL STORY OF WHY JAPAN WORKS 141, 159 (Chalmers Johnson et al. eds., 1989).
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the aggregate rarely own as much as 5% of the outstanding stock of the largest
firms, the amount the single largest owner typically has in Japan.2
The 20% owned by five shareholders in the largest Japanese firms is
bigger than any five-shareholder block in the twenty-five largest American
firms.2" In GM, Exxon, and IBM, the largest twenty-five shareholders vote
less stock than the largest five stockholders in Japan's largest firms.' If
groups with twenty-five members could coordinate as well as groups with five,
this would be a difference of little importance, but they cannot.24
Thus the first difference in corporate ownership structure is the
concentrated voting blocks in the largest German and Japanese firms, and their
absence in American firms.
B. Structured Interaction
German and Japanese CEO's regularly interact with the large owners. In
German firms, the supervisory board appoints a managerial board to a five-
year term and loosely reviews both firm and management performance,
typically two to four times a year. Although the CEO and the rest of the
managerial board handle day-to-day decisions, they must report to the
supervisory board, which the CEO may not join, much less dominate.'
Not only do German managers not control the proxy machinery, but it is
doubtful that they can even lawfully make a proxy solicitation,26 a solicitation
21. For examples, see Tables II and XIII. See generally Brancato et al., supra note 10, at app. 2.
22. If we examine smaller American firms, however, we see levels of concentration in stock ownership
that begin to approach the concentration levels typically found in Germany and Japan, although American
levels still fail to exceed the concentration in the very largest Japanese firms. Compare Tables III and XI
with Paul Clyde, The Institutional Shareholder as a Monitor of Management tbl. II (June 1991)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (showing that top five financial institutions own 18.4% of
stock in sample of 511 American companies); see also Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure
of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1165-66 (1985) (showing that
top 20 stockholders control, on average, 37.7% of outstanding stock in sample of 511 American
companies).
23. Tables II and XIII show an American 5-shareholder ownership level of only 5% and a 25-
institutional investor ownership level of 13.93% (GM), 11.47% (Exxon), 13.54% (IBM), and 12.89% (GE),
an ownership level which is typical of the largest American industrial firms. See generally Brancato et. al,
supra note 10, at app. 2.
24. Moreover, such groups of 25 face legal problems in coordinating. Black, supra note 9, at 536
(noting that proxy rules hinder coordination among investors); Roe, Political Theory, supra note 1
(discussing legal barriers to acquisitions of large blocks of stock by financial institutions). Some obstacles,
however, were recently reduced. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-31,326 [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,051 (Oct. 15, 1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276
(1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249) (reducing obstacles to exchange of views among
shareholders).
25. 2 ERNST GESSLER Er AL., AKTIENGESETZ 138-39 (1974) (commentary on § 105 of German
securities law). The managerial board's ("Vorstand's") leader, or "speaker," is first among equals. Several
large firms are private firms (GmbH for Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung, or "firm with limited
liability"), whose stock is not traded. These firms tend to have founding families who seek to maintain
influence.
26. Alfred F. Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Developments in
European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1459, 1470 (1984).
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process American managers dominate. Instead, German managers must filter
proxy solicitations through bankers, who vote their own stock, their mutual
funds' stock, and their customers' custodial stock. The banks obtain fifteen-
month revocable proxies from their brokerage customers, and prior to voting
the custodial stock, inform their customers of their intentions, giving their
customers an opportunity to instruct them to vote differently.' Rational
apathy should lead most shareholders to ignore the solicitations, and, in fact,
customers rarely disapprove of their bank's recommendation. 28 Bankers
control the proxy machinery and hence elect the stockholding side of many
supervisory boards.
It would, however, be easy to exaggerate the power of the German
supervisory board. First, translation of the German board's name, Aufsichtsrat,
as "supervisory board," while linguistically correct, does not quite reflect the
board's authority, which is less than that of a supervisor, a position one would
ordinarily suspect would yield authority to supervise. A better translation might
be "advisory board," with "advisory" meaning more than just gratuitous
consultation but a power similar to that of the U.S. Senate to advise and
consent to treaties and appointments, which yields consultation and influence
but not supervisory control.
For example, the supervisory board cannot remove the managerial board
at will during its five-year term. Moreover, the managerial board co-opts some
of the supervisory board's formal authority when a vacancy arises on the
supervisory board, in a manner similar to, but weaker than, the American
CEO's ability to name the board, by suggesting to the supervisory board who
should fill the vacancy.29 German codetermination also induces shareholder
representatives to want the supervisory board to supervise less than it
otherwise would, because a powerful supervisory board would enhance the
authority of labor's representatives on the board. The bankers generally prefer
to take their chances with the managerial board. True, if there were a
boardroom confrontation, the banker-shareholders could defeat the employees
by relying on two features of German corporate law: First, the chair of the
supervisory board is always a member of the shareholding side of the board
and can cast the deciding vote in a tie; and, second, shareholders can, with a
super-majority vote, send directions to the managerial board, bypassing the
supervisory board. 30 Thus, the supervisory board provides shareholders with
27. AKTIENGESEIZ (AKTG), §§ 135(l)-(2) (1991) (German corporations code) (authorizing revocable
general proxy to banks).
28. Sprachlose Eigentilmer: Aktiondre nehmen viel zu selten ihre Rechte als Inhaber von Unternehmen
wahr, DIE ZEIT, June 7, 1991 (stating that small shareholders cede virtually all voting rights to large banks);
see also Gottschalk, supra note 11, at 296-97; Wir sind Gerngesehene Berater, DER SPIEGEL, Sept. 4, 1989,
at 45, 48.
29. Paul Windolf, Codetermination and the Marketfor Corporate Control in the European Community,
22 ECON. & SOC'Y 137, 140-41 (1993).
30. Id. at 143.
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influence, although not control, in corporate governance. Managers still have
the upper hand, but the tilt is not nearly as pro-managerial as it has historically
been in the United States.
Although the German pattern follows what an American corporate law
scholar would predict-that large stockholders would have board seats and
influence-the Japanese pattern does not. Despite concentrated voting blocks,
the boards of Japanese firms are typically made up of insiders, formally elected
by stockholders but usually appointed by the CEO, with at most the occasional
advice and consent of the large stockholders. Stockholders usually do not
appear on the board absent a crisis. Thus, the pattern that an American
corporate law scholar would predict-that large stockholders would have board
seats and influence-occurs only in crisis, or through an informal mechanism.
An informal mechanism for stockholder influence does exist in Japan. The
financial intermediaries' leaders interact with the managers of firms in monthly
keiretsu Presidents' Council meetings, which resemble a second board,
analogous to the German supervisory board. Even though votes are not taken
at the meetings and participants do not direct one another, individual presidents
feel constrained by the consensus opinions of the council, largely because the
council members are capable people who collectively control much of the
stock in the president's firm. Council members are said to be consulted on
major decisions, as when a CEO chooses a successor.31
Our knowledge of the details of the monthly Presidents' Council meetings
is vague. Minutes are not leaked for us to examine and agendas for council
action are not printed in the Japanese press. Some reports indicate that business
is discussed32 while others say the meetings are purely social,33 paving the
way to do business later. In the following discussion, I take the Presidents'
Council to include both the meetings and the information and decisionmaking
channels created through social interactions.
No single council member controls enough stock to control the others
(although historically bank domination of credit yielded the bank control). Yet,
since a group of these stockholders could exert control, no one member can
withstand the ire of a coalition of the others; moreover, in a culture that values
consensus, no one member should be willing to risk the ire of the others:
31. See v. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
69 (1991) (describing role of keiretsu as including discussion of top personnel appointments); Charles A.
Anderson, Corporate Directors in Japan, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1984, at 30, 32 (stating that rather
than choosing a new CEO, incumbent CEO consults with the institutional owners of large blocks of firm's
stock and debt); cf. James B. Treece, 9 to 5 Japanese Style, Bus. WK., Dec. 28, 1992, at 20 (discussing
subtle, indirect communication through grapevine in Japanese firms).
32. MASAHIKO AOKI, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE FIRM 3, 12 (1984) (describing
Presidents' Council meetings as involving business discussions).
33. Michael L. Gerlach, Twilight of the Keiretsu?-A Critical Assessment, 18 J. JAPANESE STUD. 79,
80-81 (1992).
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These [council] meetings are not organs of decisionmaking in the
sense that a majority vote would carry the day, but they are
manifestations of the very dynamic process of consensus. Views are
exchanged, opinions heard, and actions reciprocally adjusted, more on
an ad hoe basis than in terms of binding policy ....
The Presidents' Council is not a hierarchical command structure, but a forum
for communication and perhaps a collegial monitoring of near-equals.
The power Japanese banks historically exercised over credit complicates
any inquiry into the influence of institutional stockholders. When Japanese
firms were rapidly expanding after the Second World War, they sought new
funds from the banks, through which Japan channeled credit. The banks' power
to cut firms off from funding for new projects yielded the banks sufficient
influence, irrespective of their stockholding.
Both stock and debt are relevant in the prevailing models, which see
delegated monitoring among Japanese banks, by which six banks buy stock in,
and make loans to, several firms. The banker-group assigns each borrowing
firm a "main bank" to which the other banks delegate monitoring tasks. In
these models, the main bank speaks with the authority of both creditors and
stockholders owning 20% of the firm's stock."
The joint causation problem does not make stock irrelevant and, if banks'
power over credit allocation continues to weaken, we shall see whether stock
alone gives them influence. There is reason to believe that, although individual
stockholders are powerless, intermediaries have influence through their stock.
Although Japanese culture may deter large stockholders from formally firing
the CEO, mild criticism in a Presidents' Council meeting may shape actions
in a culture that values harmony. Bankers do send in directors when serious
problems arise and performance weakens.36 The CEO may stay in place, but
with diluted authority, or the CEO may be "promoted" to the less powerful
position of chairperson. In 1992, the CEO's of 14% of all Japan's public
companies left, about one-third of them involuntarily.37 Moreover, when
34. ROBERT J. BALLON & IWAO TOMITA, THE FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR OF JAPANESE CORPORATIONS
68 (1988); see also MICHAEL L. GERLACH, ALLIANCE CAPITALISM: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
JAPANESE BUSINESS 108 (1992) (describing power of Presidents' Council members as implicit influence
that is continually negotiated); Anderson, supra note 31, at 30 (stating that Japanese corporate governance
"appears to take place behind the scenes between the senior corporate official and the major institutional
shareowners").
35. Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan, 11 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 399 (1989).
36. Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette Alcamo Minton, "Outside" Intervention in Japanese Companies:
Its Determinants and Its Implications for Managers (Sept. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, Banks and Corporate Control in Japan (Sept. 1, 1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
37. ...And in Japan, FORTUNE, Feb. 22, 1993, at 10 (reporting ousters, although not explicitly tying
ousters to stockholder initiatives). Although Japanese cross-ownership could insulate presidents from ouster,
see John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1298-99 & n.82 (1991), the tumover and ousters indicate the insulation is
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informality fails and confrontation ensues, stockholding banks have taken
control of the board and dismissed the CEO. When a scandal in a large
department store chain implicated the CEO, who uncharacteristically refused
to resign, the Mitsui Presidents' Council decided to replace him, and the
banker on the store's board engineered the coup de grace.38 Formal action is
probably usually unnecessary; in a small group, large shareholders should have
only to raise their voice to assert influence.39
Other incidents, such as Japanese greenmail-twenty-two instances in the
1980's-and a successful hostile takeover, indirectly suggest shareholder
power.40 Moreover, Japanese managers face fractious annual stockholder
meetings, which they control reasonably well because they go to the meetings
armed with proxies from their large shareholders.4' Obviously, if the large
stockholders denied managers the proxies, managers would face more difficult
annual meetings. Finally, stockholding institutions unhappy with managers can
threaten to sell their stock, leaving managers at the risk of a takeover. Not only
have Japanese commentators described this potential as an important theoretical
source of stock-based influence,42 but financial intermediaries have publicly
made such threats.43
In both the German and the Japanese large firm, structured interaction
between stockholding intermediaries and corporate managers enables bankers
to influence managers' actions, but not to control them completely.' In
Germany, managers can ally with employees, who hold half of the seats on the
board. Since the large voting blocks are typically split among a handful of
banks, the intermediaries must form a coalition to challenge an alliance
between managers and employees. In Japan, banks are not represented on the
board, except in crisis. And, since bank-controlled stock is typically split
among a handful of banks, a main bank must form a coalition to act. The
incomplete. If cross-holdings were fully protective, they would not allow roughly one out of every 20
CEO's to be involuntarily ousted in a single year. The insulation hypothesis may confuse intent with effect;
cross-holdings arose primarily because managers wanted to stave off takeovers and uncertainty, but friendly
5% shareholders turn unfriendly when results are poor. Or the insulation hypothesis might have seemed
warranted when the Japanese economy was humming along and good results shielded even second-rate
managers from inquiry.
38. GERLACH, supra note 34, at 111-13.
39. Japanese corporate law poses no barrier, because it allows shareholders to remove directors without
cause at any time. AOKI, supra note 32, at 10.
40. KESTER, supra note 31, at 17, 247-48.
41. Merton J. Peck, The Large Japanese Corporation, in THE U.S. BUSINESS CORPORATION: AN
INSTITUTION IN TRANSITION 21, 22 (John R. Meyer & James M. Gustafson eds., 1988).
42. Kunio Ito, M&A to Kabushik Mochiai no Honshitsu, KINYU J., Dec. 1989, at 11.
43. Insurance companies have, in recent years, been unhappy with dividend payouts and have
threatened to dump the stock of companies that fail to increase their dividends. The observed threats are
the tip of an iceberg-of uncertain size--of private influence. See Stephen D. Prowse, The Structure of
Corporate Ownership in Japan, 47 J. FIN. 1121, 1138-40 (1992). The insurers' demands may not arise
directly from firms' misuse of cash, but from the insurers' need to receive larger dividends to comply with
insurance regulations. I offer this item to show shareholder power, not to show that it is always used to
improve corporate governance.
44. There are exceptions, such as Deutsche Bank's dominant 28% block in Daimler-Benz.
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resulting authority structure is flatter than the one in the United States because
the CEO seems unable to dominate decisionmaking. And since no single
intermediary can dominate, but must form a coalition to amass a dominating
block of stock, the foreign governance structure is not equivalent to replacing
an American-style dominating CEO with a dominating institution. Thus,
structured interaction, without a shift in day-to-day control, is the second major
structural difference between the foreign firms and the American.
C. Size of Foreign Financial Intermediaries
The third major structural difference is in the size of the financial
intermediaries. The largest German and Japanese financial institutions play a
much bigger role in their economies than the largest American intermediaries
play in the American economy. Size and strength facilitate holding big blocks
of stock, a holding that is difficult to achieve here in relatively smaller
intermediaries. 45
The largest three German banks have assets equal to 36% of German gross
national product. The assets of the largest three American banks, in contrast,
are equal to only 7% of the American GNP, making the German banks about
five times "stronger" than the largest American banks. Similarly, the largest
banks in Japan, a country with a GNP about 60% of that of America, are
several times larger than their American counterparts.
TABLE IV. Summary of Bank Size in Germany, Japan, and America
46
Country Assets of Assets of Foreign American Relative Relative Ratio of
Largest Largest GNP (3) GNP (4) Size of Size of Foreign Size
Three Three Foreign American to American
Foreign American Banks (5) Banks (6) Size
Banks (1) Banks (2) [(1)1(3)] [(2)/(4)] [(5)/(6)]
Germany $600B $424B $1.65T $5.5T 0.36 0.08 4.50
Japan $1,345B $424B $3.44T $5.5T 0.39 0.08 4.88
45. The largest three American banks are much weaker players in the American economy than the
largest German and Japanese banks are in their respective economies. See Table IV. These disparities in
strength persist even if we compare each nation's largest ten banks. See Table V. Although current
exchange rates disfavor the dollar, using bank assets as a percentage of GNP, as in Table IV, eliminates
the exchange rate distortion.
46. Source: Calculated from Table V.
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TABLE V. Assets of Ten Largest German, Japanese, and American Banks
(in Billions of Dollars)47
Ten Largest German Banks Ten Largest Japanese Banks Ten Largest American Banks
Deutsche Bank 267 Dai-Ichi Kangyo 435 Citicorp 216
Dresdner Bank 189 Sumitomo 407 Bank America 110
Commerzbank 144 Fuji 403 Chase Manhattan 98
Bayerische V-Bank 138 Mitsubishi 392 J.P. Morgan 93
D. Genossen-Bank 137 Sanwa 387 Security Pacific 85
Westdeutsche 137 Industrial Bank of Japan 285 Chemical Bank 73
Bayerische H&W 117 Tokai 246 NCNB 65
Bayerische L-Bank 114 Bank of Tokyo 228 Bankers Trust NY 64
Nord-d Landesbank 83 Mitsubishi Trust 226 Manufacturers Hanover 62
Sudwest-d L-Bank 59 Norinchukin 224 Wells Fargo 56
Total 1,385 Total 3,233 Total 922
47. Source: Adapted from The Global Service 500: The 100 Largest Commercial Banking Companies,
FORTUNE, Aug. 26, 1991, at 174-75.
Because American banks are relatively small, inserting the largest mutual fund complexes and the
largest insurers into Table V would make a difference, but not much of one:













Source of asset size of insurers and mutual funds: CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS:
A WIDELY DIVERSE PRESENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, tbls. 9, 12 (Background Paper Prepared for
Columbia Institutional Investor Project, Center for Law and Economics, Feb. 25, 1993). The mutual fund
numbers are somewhat overstated because they are from 1992, while all other numbers are from 1990, and
mutual funds grew from 1990 to 1992. Adding American pension funds would not make a big difference.
TIAA-CREF, the largest pension fund with $99 billion worth of assets, would make it to the bottom of the
list. Calpers, the next largest pension fund, would not. Top 200 Pension Funds/Sponsors, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Jan. 20, 1992, at 20. Expanding Table V to include insurers would add Allianz to the
German list ($119 billion), but would not change the Japanese list. The Global Service 500, FORTUNE, Aug.
24, 1992, at 215.
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The relatively small size of American financial institutions, however, makes
it harder for them to buy a large block of stock in GM, Exxon, or IBM than
it is for the foreign banks to buy 28% of Daimler-Benz or 5% of Toyota.
Let us summarize. Concentrated blocks, shared authority, and big
intermediaries are the three key structural differences.
Although we do not know exactly how the foreign structures work, and the
data is too thin to indicate whether they work well, we must not miss the main
point here. The foreign corporate structures differ greatly from those prevailing
in America. German and Japanese senior managers share power with large
financial intermediaries, which own and vote big blocks of stock and are active
in corporate governance, formally through supervisory boards in Germany, and
informally through Presidents' Councils in Japan. The survival of these foreign
firms over several decades suggests that the classical economic model of the
firm must be reinterpreted as a special case in the U.S. setting because firms
can prosper with different governance structures. These differences appear to
correlate, not so much with differences in economic task, but with differences
in the organization of financial intermediaries. Concentrated blocks, shared
authority, and powerful intermediaries are not only uncommon here in
America; they have also been, as we next see, illegal.
D. American Banking Regulation
The organization of financial intermediaries deeply determines the structure
of corporate ownership, and law deeply determines the organization of
financial intermediaries. We can see this syllogism vividly illustrated by testing
whether or not U.S. firms and intermediaries could imitate the foreign
structures without violating America's basic laws.
Size is central. Large American banks play a role in the American
economy equal to only one-quarter of the role played by large banks in
Germany and Japan.48 This difference in size correlates with law. American
legal restrictions have historically kept American banks small and weak, by
banning them from operating nationally, entering commerce, affiliating with
investment banks, equity mutual funds, or insurers, or from coordinating
stockholdings with these other intermediaries.
The National Bank Act of 1863 historically confined national banks to a
single location, and the McFadden Act of 1927 only allowed branches of
national banks to the extent state law permitted.49 Although states may permit
out-of-state banks to open local branches, until recently they did not, and even
48. Table IV.
49. National Bank Act of 1863, ch. 106, § 44, 13 Stat. 99 (1863) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 38 (1988)); McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 1, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36
(1988)).
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the recent permissions are incomplete. Although federal law could override
state law and permit interstate branching, it does not. America still lacks a
truly national banking system like that of other nations, including Germany and
Japan.
American banks have also faced product limits. The Glass-Steagall Act has
historically denied banks a securities business and close affiliation with
investment banks and, until recently, mutual funds.50 The Bank Holding
Company Act prohibits affiliation with insurers and fine-tunes Glass-Steagall
by prohibiting bank affiliation with nonbanks, except passive ownership of no
more than 5% of a nonbank's stock.
Lastly, American deposit insurance historically encouraged weak bank
capitalization, which limited banks' ability to make large equity investments.
Bank managers can raise the private value of bank stock by keeping their
equity thin and displacing some of the risks of bank failure onto the public.
51
By encouraging low levels of capital, extensive deposit insurance has made
many banks too weak to own much stock. If deposit insurance were less
extensive, banks would be pressed to raise more equity, either by market forces
or by new bank regulation, to attract uninsured deposits and to avoid bank
runs.
52
1. German Universal Banks in the United States?
If U.S. banks tried to imitate German banks, they would smash into nearly
every U.S. financial regulation. German banks not only have a national scope
that would violate McFadden's geographic restrictions 3 but they also hold
nearly two dozen large positions in the one hundred largest German firms and
thus would violate both the U.S. ban on bank stock ownership and the 5%
50. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). Bank sponsorship of mutual funds, historically banned and only very recently accommodated under
banking law, is exploding, despite the fact that some of it is still in a legal gray area. Leslie Wayne,
Questions on Bank Sales of Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1992, at Cl (noting explosive sales growth);
Prospectus for Vista Capital Growth Fund 8 (Feb. 28, 1992) (on file with author) (prospectus of equity
mutual fund sponsored by Chase Manhattan Bank concedes cloudy legality under Glass-Steagall of bank
sponsorship). Other restrictions are slowly eroding, particularly those that confine banks to the narrow
business of commercial banking. Nevertheless, the historical restrictions have important continuing effects
because they made American banks weak, and the weak banks will need years to evolve into stronger ones.
51. Thus, while the historical sequence was that Congress prohibited bank stock ownership first (in.
1863 by the National Bank Act and in 1933 by Glass-Steagall) and then added deposit insurance (in 1934),
we could think of the justification for the prohibition as coming in the reverse order. Once Congress
established extensive deposit insurance, it also had to control the banks' level of risk and prohibiting stock
ownership was part of that control.
52. Recent regulatory initiatives forcing banks to increase their equity have been successful. Whether
unregulated banks would increase their own equity to enable them to hold stock in other firms would
depend on whether the costs of holding big blocks of equity-such as lost liquidity and increased
risk-outweighed the benefits. I outline some of the considerations below in Part V. There is, however, one
unnerving fact in favor of equity: stock persistently yields a higher retum than debt. Andrew Abel, The
Equity Premium Puzzle, FED. RES. BANK PHIL. MONTHLY REv., Sept. 1991, at 3. ,
53. McFadden Act, Pub. L. No. 69-639, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1927).
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limit on bank affiliate ownership of a nonbanking firm's stock.54 In addition,
the largest German banks are also the largest brokerage houses, and they
control the proxy machinery, which would violate the historical product
restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act. If U.S. banks were to act as brokers,
stock exchange rules would prohibit them from voting their customers' stock
on anything important,55 while German bankers can vote their customers'
stock on anything at all, and they do.
German banks combine modest direct holdings of stock with extensive
holdings of custodial stock. American banks might try to imitate them by
combining modest stock holdings in affiliates with their extensive holdings of
trust stock.5 6 The American banks would face several obstacles, the first of
which arises from trust law, which tends to induce the hyper-fragmentation of
portfolios, to reward passivity, and to reinforce America's dominant investment
norms of passivity.57
Trust law is a sufficient bar, but not the only one. A formal combination
of holding company stock and trust stock via the bank giving a proxy to the
holding company would probably violate the Bank Holding Company Act,
which prohibits bank affiliates from controlling more than 5% of a firm's
stock.58 An informal combination via consciously parallel voting would, by
itself and if the banks did nothing more, seem to be within the limits of the
Act. But its success would still depend on how aggressive the regulators would
be in applying interpretations that required holding companies to hold stock
passively. During an earlier manifestation of bank power through trust stock,
Congress held extensive hearings and, through the vehicle of Wright Patman's
House Banking Committee, castigated banker power derived from owning
stock in trust accounts and implicitly threatened banks with political costs if
they used trust stock to exert influence in corporate governance. 59 Although
we can only speculate as to whether these political forces would arise again
if banks tried to assert influence, we know that they did once arise and induced
54. See Table VIII.
55. See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL I402.06(D) (looseleaf 1990),
analyzed in Black, supra note 9, at 560-61; see also Conard, supra note 26, at 1469-70. Technically,
American banks cannot be regulated as brokers, but they nevertheless were not permitted, until very
recently, to operate brokerage firms, making the "freedom" from broker-dealer regulation moot. Again, the
American restrictions are partly historical; these features of Glass-Steagall are eroding.
56. The Glass-Steagall Act prohibits banks from themselves acquiring any stock.
57. See Black, supra note 9, at 526-30; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the
Constrained Prudent Man Rule, N.Y.U. L. REv. 52, 96-99 (1987); Mark J. Roe, Institutional Fiduciaries
in the Boardroom, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 292 (Arnold W. Sametz & James L. Bicksler eds., 1991); Mark J. Roe, The Modem Corporation
and Private Pensions (Apr. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Roe, Modem
Corporation].
58. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, §4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1988)).
59. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
89TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON BANK STOCK OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 10 (Comm. Print 1966).
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prominent practitioners to warn banks not to use trust fund stock to build
control blocks."
In any case, had American banks during most of this century tried to
imitate the Germans, they would have failed since they have been barred from
operating nationally, from entering the securities business, from using affiliates
to take blocks above 5%, and probably also from using trust stock to be active.
McFadden, Glass-Steagall, the Bank Holding Company Act, and trust law each
seem sufficient to have deterred American bankers, who, if they tried to imitate
the German bankers, would have had to run their banks from jail.
2. Japanese Main Banks in the United States?
Japanese bank and insurer groups commonly control 20% of the stock of
a large firm, intervene during crises, and meet with managers during monthly
Presidents' Council meetings where, according to some,61 they reach
consensus on direction and operations. Could this system work under U.S. law,
as some commentators assert, because no bank in the group owns more than
5% of a firm's stock, the amount permitted a bank holding company-but not
a bank-under U.S. banking law? In other words, can American bank holding
companies be active in corporate governance and take control in crisis as long
as they limit their stock ownership to 5% of a firm's outstanding shares?62
American "main" banks would suffer from the geographic and product
limitations that make them puny compared to Japanese banks. As Table V
shows, while the assets of Japan's ten largest banks are over $3 trillion, the
assets of America's ten largest banks do not total even $1 trillion-and the
American economy is larger than Japan's. No U.S. bank has the financial
strength needed to purchase a 5% stake in GM easily or to extend a huge loan
without heavy syndication. The risk to a small American bank taking a big
slice of a large industrial firm's capital was historically heightened by
geographic restraints, which led to underdiversified assets and deposits. A
bigger Japanese bank can purchase a 5% stake in Toyota without incurring the
same risks.63
Small size is enough to make law a complete barrier to an American main
bank system or America's largest firms. The Glass-Steagall Act adds to this
60. Raymond A. Enstam & Harry P. Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LAW. 289,
290-91 & n.14 (1968); A. A. Sommer, Jr., Who's "In Control?"-SEC, 21 Bus. LAW. 559, 570 (1966).
61. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
62. I've heard this argument at a number of conferences. Coffee in particular argues that because the
5% limit on stock ownership is common to both the U.S. and Japan, legal differences are unimportant.
Coffee, supra note 37, at 1295.
63. See Table X. Nor would the ability of one bank to take a big block be likely to suffice. There is
reason to think that multiple blocks make the system work, meaning that an American main bank system
might need a half-dozen or dozen financial firms with the strength to take big blocks in multiple industrial
firms.
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barrier by blocking the bank from owning stock anyway. And the Bank
Holding Company adds yet more to this barrier by encouraging banker
passivity in wielding stock that affiliated companies own.64 The Act begins
by proscribing not just control of an industrial firm, but (subject to exceptions)
ownership or control of any voting stock in an industrial firm.
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no bank holding
company shall-
(1) after May 9, 1956, acquire direct or indirect ownership or control
of any voting share of any company which is not a bank .... 65
In the most aggressive interpretation of the prohibition, Citicorp would violate
section 4(a) by accepting an irrevocable proxy to vote a single share of GM
stock. The Act then carves out an exception: the holding company may own
"shares of any company which do not include more than 5 per centum of the
outstanding voting shares of such company...., 66 But, arguably, a holding
company that combined affiliate stock with trust stock by owning 5% and
taking proxies for another 15% of the outstanding shares would "acquire...
indirect... control of... voting share[s] of any company which is not a
bank"' 67 in excess of the 5% exemption, and thereby would violate the Act.
An American banking group could try to overcome the 5% barrier by
parallel action. Five banks and insurers could each own 5%; a main bank
would nominate directors; and all would vote their 5% for the nominees. This
parallel action, even if coordinated with interbank discussion, would comply
with the words of the statute but still face two banking law problems, one
general and one specific. (It would face securities law and other problems too).
First, Congress castigated American banks as recently as the 1960's for having
more subtle means of influence, leading lawyers to recommend that banks keep
away from such boardroom power.68 Second, the Federal Reserve Board
rejected a roughly similar proposal as banned by the Act:
[I]nvestments made in reliance on [the 5% permission in] [S]ection
4(c)(6) must be essentially passive . . . [S]ection 4(c)(6) is not an
unqualified grant of permission for a bank holding company to
acquire or retain a 5 percent voting interest in any company. It is the
64. Thus, astute legal analysts' claims that law does not matter because banks in both Japan and
America face identical 5% limits on stock ownership are puzzling, since neither the stunting caused by the
McFadden Act nor the passivity rules of the Bank Holding Company Act are discussed. See, e.g., Coffee,
supra note 37, at 1278-81, 1294-95.
65. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(a), 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(a)(1) (1988)) (emphasis added). To be precise, an American bank cannot own any stock: the
permitted ownership is for a bank holding company. This distinction probably increases the costs of certain
transactions, but I assume that the effect is not large.
66. Id. § 4(c)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1988).
67. Id. § 4(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1) (1988).
68. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Board's view that the prohibition against bank holding companies'
engaging in nonbanking activities extends to joint ventures or
concerted action by a group of bank holding companies in a
nonbanking activity as entrepreneurs."'6 9
Congress did not, with the 5% rule, unleash banks to use small blocks of stock
to gain influence in corporate boardrooms, or at least so ruled the Federal
Reserve. 70 Later the Board reiterated that it "believes that section 4(c)(6)
should properly be interpreted as creating an exemption from the general
prohibitions.., on ownership .... only for passive investments amounting
to not more than 5 percent .... 71
These explicit passivity interpretations were somewhat undercut by an
earlier Federal Reserve Board interpretation concerning, ironically enough,
keiretsu main bank cross-ownership. For a time the Bank Holding Company
Act, if read literally, prohibited Japanese banks operating in the United States
from owning stock in Japanese companies located in Japan. Although the Fed
never enforced the extraterritorial reach of the Act, saying it was meant to
apply to U.S. commerce, not Japanese commerce,72 the Board asked Congress
to amend the Act when many foreign banks entered the United States in the
1970's,73 and Congress did.74
These passivity rules could break down through regulatory reinterpretation,
just as regulatory reinterpretation has expanded banks' securities power in
recent years, because the rulings come not from the clear command of the
statute, but from the Fed's plausible interpretation of that statute. Although
they may seem to be minutiae, they really are not, because they complete the
broad congressional policy preference exhibited in McFadden's branching
restrictions, Glass-Steagall's stock ownership restrictions, and the Bank
Holding Company Act's line-of-business restrictions: to keep banks small, to
69. 4 F.R.R.S. 4-338.2, Jan. 22, 1986, available in LEXIS, Bankng library, FRRS file (Federal Reserve
Board ruling regarding whether activities of mutual insurance company are "closely related to banking").
70. Because the statute does not explicitly require passivity for a 5% blockholder and does not
explicitly cover the informal relationships in Japan, the words of the statute are ambiguous. In the Federal
Reserve Board's interpretation, if the main bank is not passive, it violates the Act, but a literalist might
interpret the statute differently.
71. 12 C.F.R. § 225.137 (1990) (emphasis added). See generally PAULINE B. HELLER, FEDERAL BANK
HOLDING COMPANY LAW § 4.03[2][a], at 4-60.9 (1992).
72. And then, since the Act did not exempt foreign banks' foreign operations from the Act's reach,
the Fed did not adopt its subsequent passivity interpretations and said that activity, as long as there was
no control, passed muster. In re Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 49, 49 (1972) ("[i]n light of the
[Act's] purpose... to maintain separation of banking from commerce in the United States.") (emphasis
added).
73. INTERNATIONAL BANKING AcT OF 1978, S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978).
Actually, the Federal Reserve Board sought Congressional action even before 1972. International Banking
Act of 1976: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 30 (1976) (statement of Fed Vice Chairman Gardner
quoting 1970 Senate testimony of Chairman Bums).
74. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-369, § 8(e), 92 Stat. 623 (1978) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1841(h)(2) (1988)).
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keep private economic power unconcentrated, and to put a fault line between
banking and industry.
3. Main Banks and Universal Banks-The Potential for Control
If American banks tried to imitate either the Japanese main banks or the
German universal banks, the Act would still deter them if the Fed revoked its
passivity rule and allowed activity short of control.75 Large investors want the
option to exert control, even if they rarely exercise it. When Berkshire
Hathaway buys a big block of stock and sits on a firm's board, it does not
want day-to-day control. It does, however, want the freedom to take
control-to replace the CEO in a crisis as it did in the recent Salomon
Brothers scandal. Short of crisis, large shareholders with the potential to exert
control are more influential if not barred from control. Since crisis intervention
is a key function of the foreign systems, a regulatory bar on control is a steep
barrier.
76
U.S. banks can and sometimes do assert control over firms, particularly
small firms, 77 as lenders, without violating the Bank Holding Company Act.
Banks whose holding companies own stock should be shy of doing so, because
the source of control-debt or stock-would probably be unclear. Indeed, stock
can support the loan because in crisis stock can yield control by voting in new
directors fasier than debt can yield control by enforcing covenants in
bankruptcy. Moreover, even if U.S. banks can show that their control came
from lending, not owning stock, the stock heightens the risk of equitable
subordination of their loans in bankruptcy and claims of lender liability outside
bankruptcy. Unlike main banks in Japan, which are subordinated by custom,
informal agreement, and Ministry of Finance guidance, U.S. creditors can
avoid equitable subordination (and lender liability) by inaction.78 The main
bank, already subordinated, can improve its return on its loan by fixing the
firm that is in crisis, not by ignoring the crisis.
75. When the literal reading of the statute prohibited Japanese banks from acquiring American banks
if they were active in commerce in Japan, the Fed interpreted § 4(c)(6) as prohibiting only control, not
activity. See supra text accompanying note 72.
76. PAUL SHEARD, THE ROLE OF THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK WHEN BORROWING FIRMS ARE IN
FINANCIAL DISTRESS (Stanford Center for Economic Policy Research Working Paper No. 330, 1992).
77. Thus, I understand that some banks involved in leveraged buyouts have accepted the risks outlined
in this section.
78. See, e.g., Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); State National Bank of El
Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); J. Mark Ramseyer, Japanese Main Banks
as a Regulatory Artifact: The Legal Framework (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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4. Main Banks and Universal Banks-The Suppression and Capture of
the Securities Market
A society can move savings from households to firms through strong
stockholding intermediaries or through a securities market. America's Glass-
Steagall Act severed the intermediary channel from the securities channel,
weakening American intermediaries by creating two channels. In Germany, the
banks captured the securities channel; the German securities market is weak,
and the banks substantially control it, a result that allows for powerful
intermediaries, which can provide both banking and securities services to firms
and households. As we have seen, a big part of the German banks' voting
power comes from securities owned by the banks' customers and deposited
with the banks.
The Japanese situation is more complex. One might think that because
Japan has a Glass-Steagall Act-imposed on it during the American postwar
occupation-it would resemble America in having two channels. One might
then mistakenly argue that because Japan has a Glass-Steagall Act, Glass-
Steagall did not restrain the development of powerful U.S. banks.
But such an argument misunderstands Japan's Glass-Steagall Act. In fact,
until recently Japan has more resembled Germany in having essentially one
channel. Like the American version, the Japanese Act severed commercial
banks from investment banks. But the Japanese system then took a different
path: Japanese postwar regulation skewed industry financing toward banks and
away from the securities market by (1) suppressing the bond market through
collateralization and issuance regulations;79 (2) limiting competing sources of
corporate finance, such as equity issuance;8" (3) impeding the development
of investment companies;8 ' (4) requiring that banks serve as trustees for
bondholders when companies were allowed access to the bond market;82 and
(5) holding down the interest rates paid on deposits to enable banks to profit
even when lending at low rates.
Properly understood, postwar Japan adopted two offsetting sets of
regulations. One set segmented finance but was not as severe as U.S.
regulation-although Japanese banks could not issue securities, sell insurance
or own very large blocks of stock, they could become large and be active in
corporate governance. The second set channeled finance through banks by
79. FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, FINANCIAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 157-66 (1989).
80. ROBERT ZIELINSKI & NIGEL HOLLOWAY, UNEQUAL EQUITES: POWER AND RISK IN JAPAN'S
STOCK MARKET 156 (1991); Ramseyer, supra note 78, at 23-31; MIKUNI & Co., BANKING 5 (Occasional
Paper No. 2, 1987).
81. Hideki Kanda, Politics, Formalism, and the Elusive Goal of Investor Protection: Regulation of
Structured Investment Funds in Japan, 12 U. PA. INT'L L. REV. 569 (1991).
82. MASAHIKO AOKI, THE JAPANESE FIRM AS A SYSTEM OF A'TRIBUTES: A SURVEY AND RESEARCH
AGENDA 17-18 (Stanford Center for Economic Policy Research Publication No. 288, 1992). Thus Japan
pushed corporate borrowers into commercial banks and limited savers' options.
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ensuring that depositors had few options other than banks and that large
corporate borrowers had few nonbank financing sources.83 Thus, Japan
effectively "repealed" the American imposed Glass-Steagall separation, not by
allowing commercial banking to mix with investment banking, but by
stymieing a securities market and channeling savings and corporate financing
into the banking system. 84
Hence, although laws in both nations severed investment banking from
commercial banking, the results differed, because, unlike the Americans, the
Japanese allowed their banks nationwide operations, forced savers to use banks
on terms favorable to the banks, and required corporations to seek financing
through the banks. In operation, Japan did not have the Glass-Steagall Act that
America had. America constructed two big competing financial channels; Japan
channeled both savings and finance through the banks. The single channel
allowed the Japanese banks to be powerful enough to take a serious role in
corporate ownership.
The Japanese single channel for finance is now weakening for two reasons.
Success has given Japanese firms the luxury to retain earnings, thereby side-
stepping the banks' control over the financing channel. (This success and the
side-stepping it facilitated now make the banks' control over stock potentially
more important than it has been.) Also, the channelling regulations that once
offset Glass-Steagall are disappearing. Regulatory change has opened up the
securities channel a bit, thereby weakening the commercial banks because they
have not completely succeeded in getting regulators to allow them full entrance
into the newly-widening securities channel.85
E. Other Regulatory Impediments
Since my purpose here is not to catalog unending legal impediments but
only to show that the foreign systems would fall under American law, even
one show-stopper restriction-McFadden, for example-suffices. In addition,
the other major U.S. financial intermediaries-insurers, mutual funds, and
pensions-have historically also been precluded from taking big financial
positions in America's largest firms, preclusions consistent with the general
thesis that the structure of the large firm is highly sensitive to the structure of
83. Cf Ramseyer, supra note 78, at 23-31.
84. See Bruce Kasman & Anthony P. Rodrigues, Financial Liberalization and Monetary Control in
Japan, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. Q. REv., Autumn 1991, at 28, 29-31 & n.4. Determining which is the
"natural" base-American securities markets or Japanese banks-is difficult because America has burdened
big banks while Japan has subsidized them. Nationwide banking seems a natural baseline, which only
America eliminated, thereby reducing nonsecurities alternatives for large firms and facilitating the
development of a securities market. If large American banks had existed, they might have made large loans
and stock investments that in America had to flow through the securities market.
85. This discussion of forcing funds through banks is offered as a comparison with Japan, not as a
policy recommendation.
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financial intermediaries, which in turn is highly sensitive to law. For half a
century, major American insurers were prohibited from owning any stock, 6
and mutual funds have been discouraged from acquiring influential blocks of
stock.87 Pension funds, while not formally prohibited from buying influential
blocks, are controlled by managers of large firms who discourage such
influence, rather than by managers of financial intermediaries who might
encourage it."
Securities laws historically have made communication among stockholders
costly. Until last year, ten stockholders who merely spoke with one another
about corporate events and managers risked violating proxy rules.8 9 Interbank
(and interfinancier) communications among banks with large blocks of stock
could have been construed as a proxy solicitation, thus necessitating a public
filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Under state antitakeover
laws, group votes are generally sterilized, trigger poison pills, or violate
"control share" statutes.
90
Why don't U.S. firms participate directly in each other's governance by
holding large blocks of each other's stock? Although there are no explicit
prohibitions, operating firms are poorly suited to hold large blocks of stock
because they usually prefer to deploy their capital for other purposes. Even in
Japan, where industrial cross-holdings play a role, financial intermediaries hold
two-thirds of the blocks, while industrial firms hold only one-third of them.
Moreover, American industrial cross-holdings would be taxed. In the 1930's
Congress passed a dividends received tax explicitly to discourage such
corporate complexes. 9'
Why did the United States adopt so many impediments to institutional
voice in corporate governance? American populism-a popular mistrust of
powerful private financial intermediaries-and American interest group
jockeying yielded many of the restrictions. While German and Japanese
politics display some similarities-particularly popular distrust in Germany and
interest group infighting in Japan-foreign politics has been different. Different
political paths yielded different financial institutions, and different financial
institutions yielded different corporate structures. We shall return to consider
these historical and political influences in Part IV. Before we do, however, we
86. Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of the Insurance Industry,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 639 (1993).
87. Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1469, 1470 (1991).
88. See generally Roe, Modem Corporation, supra note 57.
89. See Black, supra note 9, at 537-41. New proxy rules, adopted on October 15, 1992, reduce, but
do not eliminate, some of these possibilities.
90. See, e.g., Cullen v. Milligan, 578 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio 1991) (applying Ohio control share statute);
Atlantis Group, Inc. v. Alizae Partners, No. 1:90 CV-937, 1991 WL 319384, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 27,
1991) (applying Michigan control share statute).
91. Roe, supra note 87, at 1478. Today the tax rate is about 10% of the dividend. The tax also
discourages bank cross-holdings.
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must first assess a preliminary economic argument-that financial evolution
necessarily yields a fragmented financial system. After all, if fragmentation is
inevitable, we need not bother with the difficult task of hypothesizing whether
intermediary participation in flattened corporate structures is on balance
advantageous. Over time entropy will prevail, the argument goes, and
ownership will fragment.
III. FINANCIAL EVOLUTION IN GERMANY AND JAPAN?
In this Part, I briefly examine economic evolution here and in Germany
and Japan. While it is possible that financial evolution inevitably fragments
ownership of the large firm, the evidence suggests that intermediaries'
economic evolution is uneven and that fragmentation is not economically
inevitable. The financial markets in Germany and Japan may not be moving
toward full American-style securities markets with fragmented ownership; there
is as much evidence of stability and concentration abroad as there is of
fragmentation. It is equally plausible that our markets and ownership forms are
approaching-weakly and unevenly-the more concentrated structures of
Germany and Japan. Thus, we should re-interpret recent trends in the United
States toward ownership concentration and institutional voice as the delayed
results of the repeated historical suppression of powerful American financial
intermediaries.
A. The Evolutionary Argument
Do Germany and Japan lag behind America's financial evolution? In time,
the argument runs, finance liquifies and disintermediates. Securitization,
diversification, and fragmentation of stockholdings erode big institutional
blocks. Powerful intermediaries wither as stock disperses into small blocks
held by individuals and weak institutions. Commercial paper replaces bank
loans, eroding banks' interest in holding stock in their former loan customers.
Hence, the universal problems of financial organization eventually compel
dispersed ownership, managerial agency problems, and structures for dealing
with agency costs similar to those in America. According to the evolutionary
argument, then, the powerful financial institutions in Germany and Japan are
only temporary and will ultimately come to resemble U.S. financial
institutions, which represent the highest form of financial development.
Inevitable economic forces will erode the presence of institutions at the top of
foreign firms.
I question this view. True, German banks' boardroom power is under
stress.92 And the Japanese main bank system is under severe stress from
92. See infra notes 123-129 and accompanying text.
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increased securitization of debt in Japan, the internationalization of financial
markets, Bank of International Settlements capital standards that penalize stock
ownership, the increase in Japanese corporate retained earnings, and a sinking
Japanese stock market. I suspect that key features of the main bank
system-those involving bank control of large firm new financing-will not
survive and may already be gone. Nevertheless, German banks' big stock
holdings have increased, not decreased, over the last twenty-five years, and
Japanese bank ownership of large Japanese firms has been rock-solid at
roughly 20% of the outstanding shares for the past twenty-five years. These
trends belie the inevitability of fragmentation. And, as I discuss in Part IV, if
there is financial evolution, political forces are playing a role.
B. Problems with the Evolutionary Argument
Securitization and economic change are indisputable facts. Their effects,
and the possibility of substitutes, are in doubt.
1. Securitization
Securitization produces three threats to German universal banks and
Japanese main banks. First, as debt securitizes, commercial paper and bonds
replace bank loans, so commercial banks' influence as lender declines. Second,
as banks make fewer loans to their customers, they could become less
interested in holding their customers' stock; if they sell the stock, commercial
banks' influence as stockholder declines. Third, as liquid securities markets
develop, institutions fragment their stock holdings and, the argument would
run, no financial institution, and certainly no bank, would want to hold a big
block of stock; institutional influence through big blockholding declines.
The first threat is real. As some debt has securitized, banks' influence has
declined. But must banks' power from stock wither as debt increasingly
securitizes?" Does the realization of the first threat to bank power---declining
loans-demand realization of the second threat-declining stock? The evidence
suggests not. As Table VI shows, German bank ownership of large blocks of
stock in the largest firms has increased during the past twenty years, and, as
seen in Table I, Japanese bank ownership of stock in large firms was stable
throughout the 1980's. 94 Those predicting fragmentation may well have
93. Banks are a conduit between savers and borrowers. Depositors place money in banks, and the
banks then lend those funds, but are obligated to repay the deposits even if the loans are not repaid. Yet
securities markets are increasingly assuming these functions. Depositors who used to deposit their money
in the bank now lend the money to corporations without using banks as intermediaries. To bypass the
banks, providers of short-term funds buy commercial paper from industrial corporations and providers of
long-term loans buy bonds.
94. Between 1977 and 1992, the banks sold a modest 1% when Japan lowered the maximum bank
holding from 10% to 5% of the outstanding shares of stock, to take effect in stages through 1987. The sell-
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conflated an inevitable weakening of fractional reserve banking-the first
threat-with a weakening of large stockholding institutions. The first is likely
and the current trend the world over; the second may not at all be likely and
is certainly not yet supported by the German and Japanese evidence.
TABLE VI. German Banks 5% or Greater Positions
in the 100 Largest Firms
95
Year 1972 1975 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Number of Positions 20 21 25 26 25 29 30 30 33
A common misconception is that German bank influence comes only from
credit. Americans are so inured to the separation of banks from commerce that
we tend to view credit allocation as the banks' primary means of influence.
Although German banks' absolute power over credit has already withered for
the large German firms, 9 6 their stock-based control over the proxy system has
off stabilized in 1985. This 1% sell-off equals the bank-owned stock above 5% in 1977, as Table XII
shows. Law and Japanese politics, not securitization, best explain the sell-off. Japanese Federal Trade
Commission, The Actual Conditions of the Six Major Corporate Groups 2 (Aug. 1 1989) (unpublished
report, on file with author).
Now that Japanese stock prices are depressed, another sell-off has been predicted (but not observed).
This situation mirrors the one in which stock prices were high and a sell-off was also predicted. See Larry
Zoglin, Stable Cross-Holding of Shares Likely to Withstand Pressures, JAPAN ECON. J., June 21, 1986, at
7. Tables III and XI show that a sell-off did not occur. In general, though, a sell-off at high prices seems
more plausible then one at low prices. When prices are high, insiders reap a gain by selling, but when they
are low, insiders incur a loss.
95. Source: JORGEN BOHM, DER EINFLUSS DER BANKEN AUF GROSSUNTERNEHMEN 238 (1992). Nor
is this a repositioning of stock. Banks' direct ownership of public companies has been rising:
TABLE VII. German Banks' Ownership of Public Companies
Year 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988 1990
Percentage of Public Company
Stock Owned by Banks 6% 7% 9% 8% 9% 10%
Source: Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Control: A Synthesis of the International Evidence 24
(Nov. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (using Deutsche Bank data).
The reader will recognize a discrepancy between Table VI and Table VIII, which shows twenty-two
5% blocks. Table VI seems to include blocks in the top German banks, but Table VII does not. The key
issue here is that the number of big block positions is increasing not decreasing.
96. Michael H. Best & Jane Humphries, The City and Industrial Decline, in THE DECLINE OF THE
BRITISH ECONOMY 223, 224 (Bernard Elbaum & William Lazonick eds., 1986). Since 1970, retained
earnings constitute 84% of new German corporate financing-about the same level as in America. CLAUDIO
BORIO, LEVERAGE AND FINANCING OF NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 15
(Bank for International Settlements Economic Papers, No. 27, 1990).
Of the (small) amount of capital projects that are financed externally (i.e., without relying on retained
earnings), in Germany, 70% is provided by the banks while in America only 25% is provided by the banks.
Randall J. Pozdena, Commerce and Banking: The German Case, WEEKLY LETTER (Fed. Reserve Board
of S.F., Cal.) Dec. 18, 1987, at 2; see also J.S.S. EDWARDS & KLAUS FISCHER, BANKS, FINANCE AND
1960
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not, and their big blockholdings are increasing.97 True, since Japanese credit
control has weakened only in recent years, we cannot be sure Japan will take
the same path as Germany did. Because bank financing is higher in Japan than
in Germany, the banks' influence as lender-whose decline constitutes the first
threat-will decrease as competing financing channels open. But if Japanese
banks can enter the securities channel, the first threat may not be devastating;
such entry would not only enable them to keep influence via debt, albeit
securitized debt, but would enable them to retain a weakened credit-based
motivation to hold stock.
The third threat is that securitization would necessarily destroy big blocks.
In theory, this is false.98 Debt and stock may disintermediate from direct
ownership by banks and reappear in a complex intermediary that combines
mutual funds, insurance funds, brokerage stock, and pensions. To some extent,
this combination already exists in Germany. Deutsche Bank combines several
of these, and the new Dresdner-Allianz Insurance combination combines
several others.99 Stock-based power seems to be increasing in Japan, as a
substitute for credit-based power. Japanese banks now dispatch more directors
to industry, not fewer,00 and Japanese insurers are becoming more
assertive.'0 ' Furthermore, the extent of the disintegration depends upon
Japan's Glass-Steagall Act and the absence of strong nonbank intermediaries.
Without Glass-Steagall, Japanese banks might become brokers or sponsor
mutual funds; disintermediated debt and stock could consolidate and be held
by brokers and mutual funds affiliated with banks. 02 In fact, commercial
INVESTMENT IN WEST GERMANY SINCE 1970 21 (Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper
Series No. 497, 1991) (arguing that German stock corporations "relied hardly at all on bank borrowing as
a source of finance for investment over the period 1971-85, and instead were largely internally financed").
97. EDWARDS & FISCHER, supra note 96.
98. The evolutionary theorists mistakenly offer this syllogism:
(1) Banks are the intermediaries with governance influence in Germany and Japan.
(2) Banks' core function is to lend money.
(3) Securitization and retained earnings marginalize banks' credit.
(4) Therefore, as securitization reduces bankers control over credit, financial institutions' influence
must weaken.
Statements (1), (2), and (3) are true, but, due to substitutes and stock-based power, (4) is not.
99. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
100. Japanese Federal Trade Commission, supra note 94, at 2; cf. Kaplan & Minton, supra note 36,
at 20 (noting more bank interventions as stock performance weakens). Whether bank monitoring should
be interpreted as the intervention of residual stockholder, or of a large creditor, or as intervention arising
from contractual relations in the production process, is discussed briefly infra notes 194-198 and
accompanying text and in detail in Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu:
Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993).
101. KESTER, supra note 31, at 216 (Japan's largest insurer, Nippon Life, says it used to be passive
as a shareholder but is now beginning to assert its position as an investor where it affects the return on
investment). Although insurers have increased their stockholdings, partly to pick up the stock that banks
were forced to sell when the lid was lowered from 10% to 5%, they are now reaching the limits of their
legal (and perhaps financial) ability to hold stock. JACK MCDONALD, ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
CROSS-HOLDINGS IN JAPANESE COMPANIES 9 (Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Technical
Note No. 79, 1991).
102.) Even if bond debt replaces bank debt, if bank affiliates hold that debt, elements of the main bank
system would be recreated, although in muted form. Indeed, as the Japanese Glass-Steagall Act has been
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bank evolution to a more complex intermediary is budding in Japan, and the
Ministry of Finance has proposed allowing banks to buy, sell, trade, and form
mutual funds for commercial paper and bonds. Investment companies and
funded pensions are expected to flourish.10 3 Hence, Japanese banks' power
in corporate governance will continue to erode only if they lack the political
power to get Japan's version of Glass-Steagall rolled back. To date they have
been only partly successful.' °4
Even if German and Japanese banks sold their stock, someone would own
the stock that banks now own. Dispersed individuals might hold the stock in
small blocks, although that is unlikely; small institutions might buy small
blocks of the stock, and that is possible. Or, new concentrations might arise,
such as larger German banker-broker networks, or powerful mutual funds, or
expanded versions of the Japanese system of customer-supplier cross-
ownership. Finally, the Japanese banks might "sell" their stock to affiliates, if
the banks induce repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act.'05
2. Autonomy
The evolutionary paradigm for Germany and Japan posits that powerful
intermediaries develop industry, and their power then erodes due to the
securities market's disintegrating effects. If there were powerful intermediaries
resembling the universal banks or the main banks in America's past, and they
weakened as they were displaced by a superior securities market, then the
argument that foreign nations now lag behind America would be more
convincing. We could predict a single path for financial fragmentation. But
powerful stockholding intermediaries were generally absent in American
history. We should not view the evolution of financial systems as following a
single economic path, in which every system ultimately converges on highly
diversified portfolios, fragmented ownership, and weak intermediaries.
Details from American history are suggestive. In nineteenth-century New
England, entrepreneurs tightly bound their operating firms with banks.
Similarly, the Japanese zaibatsu families bound their industrial firms with
banks, and Deutsche Bank in its early history helped finance new companies
like Siemens and AEG. The foreign banks grew into big national financial
rolled back slightly, the Japanese banks have moved into the debt securities market. MASAHIKO AOKI,
INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND BARGAINING IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 141 (1988).
103. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 79, at 75; Kanda, supra note 81, at 569.
104. Japan Will Allow Overlap of Banks, Brokerage Firms, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1992, at A4
(describing slow, partial erosion of Japanese Glass-Steagall Act).
105. The result is likely to depend on the future nature of business. The Japanese managerial style,
labor relations, and rapidly changing product cycle have favored today's ownership structure. If these
underlying business features change, the old structures may become less useful. Cf. Masahiko Aoki, Toward
an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1 (1990). A plausible prediction is that some
firms, like those whose business is easily understood by investors in the securities market, will securitize
while others will not.
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institutions, the American banks did not, and the ties between the American
entrepreneurs and their local banks withered. Why? As economic opportunities
shifted from New England to the national economy, the New England banks
could not get good information about distant firms, and the bankers could
participate in the national economy only as passive buyers of short-term
commercial paper.10 6 "[T]he legal prohibitions against branch banking and
the distance between economic centres produced... relatively small, not very
closely connected, short-term markets. . . .Because of the prohibition on
interstate branching, a national market had to await the development of a...
commercial paper [market]."' 17 Entrepreneurs affiliated with banks could go
national, as economic opportunities certainly did, but the bankers, due to
interstate branching restrictions, could not.'"
Recent German trends and Japanese economic history also undercut the
argument that their ownership structures must evolve toward the American
model. First, German managers have behaved inconsistently toward banker
control of the proxy system. Many German companies have limited the voting
of outsiders, not to undercut the power of bankers, but to thwart hostile
takeovers.' 09 Managers, it seems, choose to have large, sometimes influential
(but not dominating) blocks of stock controlled by financial intermediaries
when they fear a hostile takeover. Second, Japanese cross-holdings are a recent'
phenomenon. Before World War II, the zaibatsu combined banks and industrial
firms, under family ownership, with banks as the weaker player. During World
War II, the Japanese government munitions planners weakened the authority
of the family owners. After World War II, the American occupation broke up
the zaibatsu and distributed stock widely. Eventually enough stock fell into
bank hands to give rise to banker authority. During the 1960's cross-holdings
accelerated for two reasons. Many Japanese managers feared that joint ventures
with American companies would end up with the American firm owning the
Japanese firm; they wanted a lot of stock placed in safe, friendly Japanese
hands. In addition, in the late 1960's corporate Japan feared that the Japanese
106. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Information Problems and Banks' Specialization in Short-Term
Commercial Lending: New England in the Nineteenth Century, in INSIDE THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF INFORMATION 161, 180 (Peter Temin ed., 1991) ("[N]ow that
firms could issue their IOUs through note brokers, who would market them to banks and financial
intermediaries across the country, banks lost their ability to assess a customer's total indebtedness.")
(emphasis added). Since banks have an advantage in information gathering, one wonders why bankers
ceded the profits to investment brokers, other than because, unlike banks, brokers could market notes
throughout the country.
107. Lance E. Davis, The Capital Markets and Industrial Concentration: The U.S. and U.K., A
Comparative Study, 19 ECON. HIST. REV. (2d ser.) 255, 260 (1966).
108. Massachusetts (like other states) also prohibited its banks from lending to out-of-state firms
(although it apparently didn't stop them from buying securitized commercial paper). Lance E. Davis,
Capital Immobilities and Finance Capitalism: A Study of Economic Evolution in the United States 1820-
1920, 1 EXPLORATIONS IN ENTREPRENEURIAL HIST. 88, 99 (1963). Regulation sufficiently explains the
result; whether it was necessary, we cannot know.
109. BAUMS, supra note 16, at 10.
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government would sell stock from financially-distressed brokerage houses; this
risk and depressed stock prices created fear of American-style takeovers, which
cross-holdings, including holdings by banks, would deter. The cross-holdings
that are at the core of modem Japanese corporate governance are a post-World
War II institution.11t The bank-centered keiretsu succeeded the old-line
zaibatsu. Then, during the postwar decades, newly rising big firms independent
of the traditional keiretsu have chosen the same concentrated institutional
ownership. '
American managers might have encouraged strong financial intermediaries
to enter the boardroom had they feared similar uncertainties. If American
managers had not been so successful in defeating takeovers with poison pills,
legislative antitakeover barriers, and the luck of a rising stock market, they
might have invited intermediaries into corporate boardrooms. They may well
have disliked powerful stockholders but probably detested hostile takeovers
more. Managers and financiers could have formed an irrepressible political
coalition to undo existing American legal barriers to a close nexus between
finance and industry.
11 2
Although I cannot rely on this "might-have-been" claim to prove that
evolution into fragmented ownership and liquid securities markets is not
inevitable, I can point to a few targets that sought big blockholders to protect
themselves from takeovers." 3 Had U.S. managers not defeated takeovers in
other ways, big blocks might have been management's next defense. Similarly,
after the prospect of American-style takeovers arose in Germany,"4 Dresdner
Bank, Allianz Insurance Company, and Hoechst, a huge chemical firm,
developed major cross-shareholdings among themselves and other German
I10. McDONALD, supra note 101, at 1.
111. See Table XI (some of the 14 largest firms, shown in Table III, overlap with the new
"independents" shown in Table XI). Some see the new Japanese large firms that have arisen outside the
old-line successors to the zaibatsu as a sign of institutional ownership's erosion. Coffee, supra note 37, at
1301-02. Since, however, the new firms' institutional ownership structure is identical to that of the old-line
firms, their rise does not show a decay in institutional ownership. Moreover, because the new firms are a
tad more profitable than the old ones, some conclude that cross-ownership is deleterious to shareholders.
But since the new firms have the same ownership structure (and frequently have founding families with
some stock as well), institutional ownership structure is not a relevant variable.
112. Cf Carol J. Loomis, The New J.P. Morgans, TIME, Feb. 29, 1988, at 44 (listing LBO's with
financiers on board). Many LBO's dealt with managers' misdirected use of free cash flow to build empires,
a problem Japanese firms are only now beginning to face. Thus, the point here is not that LBO's and
institutional ownership are perfect equivalents, but that LBO's flatten authority by bringing financiers into
the boardroom, thus calling into question the notion that economic evolution inevitably drives large firms
toward fragmented ownership.
113. Vineeta Anand, Warren Buffett Effect: A Quick Jump in Stock Prices, Aug. 23, 1991, at 8, 8 ("In
September 1987, Buffett infused $700 million into Salomon, then facing a takeover threat from Ronald
Perelman. He was rewarded with two seats on the board . .. "); David A. Vise, CBS Loses $114 Million
in Quarter A Record, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1985, at El, El ("Loews Corp. Chairman Laurence A. Tisch
was elected to the CBS board ... [Loews' stock ownership] is expected to bring stability to a company
that has been the subject of intense takeover speculation ... ").
114. The most prominent of these was Pirelli's multiyear siege of Continental, the large German tire
manufacturer. See Andrew Joncus, Continental AG Shareholders Deliver Pirelli Another Blow, WALL ST.
J. EUR., July 6, 1992, at 4.
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industrial companies." 5 The Japanese construction after World War II of
new vertical keiretsu around the firms that emerged independent of the old-line
keiretsu and the acceleration of cross-holdings in the 1960's are similar. Thus,
features of all three nations-the recent German keiretsu-style cross-ownership,
the fact that Japanese cross-ownership is a post-World War II institution, and
the scattered American antitakeover blocks-all tend to contradict the
inevitability of fragmentation.
3. American Evolution
Commentators assert that Germany and Japan will ultimately evolve to
American-style diffuse ownership. Perhaps they will. Japanese main banks are
undergreat financial pressure, which could lead them to sell stock to raise
cash; without affiliated allies such as bank-controlled trusts, mutual funds or
pensions to relieve some of the pressure and hold some stock, it is difficult to
see how the Japanese system can continue in its present form. Yet, unnoticed
is the prospect that U.S. firms may be evolving-weakly and
unevenly-toward the German and Japanese style of ownership. U.S.
intermediaries have steadily taken on new functions. The next natural
evolutionary stage in American corporate finance might be the entrance of
financial institutions into corporate boardrooms,'"6 perhaps by electing
directors whose loyalty runs to them, not the managers. Indeed, Berkshire
Hathaway, an insurer whose big blocks and legal authority to buy them are
recent acquisitions, already vaguely resembles the German universal banks and
Japanese main banks. And, leveraged buyouts, although different in key ways,
also increase the voice of institutions in corporate governance."1
7
True, the five largest American holders rarely own much more than 5%
of the twenty-five largest American firms, and only a few approach the level
of German ownership and voting and of Japanese concentration."
8
Nevertheless, some institutions have been active in corporate
governance-making shareholder proposals, seeking to elect directors, and
115. Hans Otto Eglau, Allianz/Dresdner Bank-Vermachtet und Verschachtelt [Empowered and
Interconnected], DIE ZErr, Aug. 16, 1991, at 19. The holdings were also tax-driven. Dresdner is Germany's
second-largest bank, Allianz its largest insurer, and Hoechst the sixth-largest industrial firm. Lufthansa and
Bayer are expected to join. The cartoon accompanying this article suggests popular reproach to the
concentration of private economic power by showing an Allianz-Dresdner octopus gobbling up German
industry. Id. Banks are hubs of new industrial networks elsewhere in Germany, with cross-representation
of network members on boards. Kirsten S. Wever & Christopher S. Allen, Is Germany a Model for
Managers?, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 36, 42.
116. Cf. Robert C. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1981).
117. Gilson & Roe, supra note 100, at 902-04 (discussing similarities and differences); Jensen, supra
note 9, at 65-66 (noting similarities).
118. The rarities are mainly the large blocks held by Berkshire Hathaway. Coca-Cola had a five-
shareholder concentration level of 20%, as might a Japanese firm, but due to legal anomalies-holdings
by Berkshire Hathaway, an insurance holding company operating outside the norm, and a bank exempt
from the Bank Holding Company Act's general provisions.
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petitioning the Securities and Exchange Commission to loosen restraints on
their activity."9 If these trends continue and expand to include holding big
blocks of stock, U.S. corporate ownership may someday begin to resemble the
German and Japanese systems.
American aggregate concentration is already a pale imitation of foreign
corporate structures. The largest twenty-five institutional investors vote, on
average, 16% of the stock of the twenty-five largest American
corporations." 0 While this is a far cry from the three institutions in Germany
that vote 40%, or the five in Japan that vote 20%, it shows that U.S. large firm
ownership is no longer that of an atomized Berle-Means corporation. And
shareholder concentration for the next tier of U.S. firms is even greater,
approaching the level of concentration in Japan. Since many of these second-
tier stockholders are mutual funds and pensions, we can see that the U.S. trend
over the past century has been, first, a suppression early in the century of the
"basic" intermediaries (banks and insurers), followed by an emergence in the
1990's of other institutions (mutual funds and pensions) as substitutes.
4. Economic Evolution and the Cost of Capital
A meta-economic explanation, atop the classical one, helps explain the
different laws that influence corporate structures. Societies afflicted with
capital scarcity have reason to organize firms differently than societies with
more abundant capital. Historically, capital and natural resources were
relatively abundant in the United States. In Germany and Japan, on the other
hand, capital was scarce in the post-World War I1 decades.12' Whenever a
resource is relatively scarce, people and institutions are willing to pay to
monitor its proper use. In the American southwest, water is scarce and
metered, and its use is a serious legal issue; elsewhere, where water is
abundant, its use is unmetered and unregulated. Likewise, when capital became
relatively scarcer in the United States, as reflected in the rising interest rates
of the 1980's, more mechanisms to monitor its deployment came forth; and
when Japanese success led to relatively greater stores of capital in the 1990's,
monitoring mechanisms may have declined. 22
119. E.g., Randall Smith, Calpers Mulls Stakes in Funds Seeking Changes in Firns' Strategy
Governance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1992, at A3.
120. Brancato et al., supra note 10, at tbl. 7.
121. Although the cost of capital that Japan "posted"--its interest rate-have made its capital seem
cheap, in fact bank rationing effectively reflected a capital scarcity after World War II.
122. This fact could revive the evolutionary argument; one could argue that as economic tasks change,
the level of monitoring changes. For example, German and Japanese corporate structures may be
particularly adept at managing new investments and thus may be most suitable during a sustained general
economic expansion. But in mature economies some firms expand while some contract, making a mixed
system suitable.
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Thus, as it turns out, current data indicate that fragmentation is not yet
economically inevitable; there is as much (or more) evolutionary concentration
here as there is evolutionary fragmentation there.
IV. POLITICAL EVOLUTION IN GERMANY AND JAPAN?
Even if German and Japanese stock ownership were fragmenting (and
American ownership were not concentrating), the incompleteness of current
corporate theories would persist. We would need to determine the degree to
which politics in Germany and Japan is inducing financial evolution in those
countries. Financial fragmentation could be inherent in twentieth-century
democracy, rather than merely inherent in American democracy as I
hypothesized earlier. Both foreign nations' political and corporate histories
could have evolved together: large industry emerged abroad when
nondemocratic governments kept fragmenting forces in check; indeed, today's
foreign democracies affect corporate structures, but in ways and degrees
different from that which occurred in the American past.
Although my goal here is not to provide a definitive history of how
German and Japanese politics affected their corporate structures- I commend
that task to those with the requisite knowledge and language skills, which I
lack-even a cursory inquiry by a nonexpert shows that political forces are at
work in Germany and Japan, shaping the governance of the large firm. Indeed,
how could it be otherwise? The movement of capital from savers to firms has
to attract political attention and affect either public opinion or interest groups,
whose interactions with political institutions will influence the organization of
financial institutions, which in turn will affect the ownership structure of the
large firm.
A. German "Populism"
Deutsche Bank reviews whether to allow its employees to chair an
industrial firm's board, and some German banks have sold directly-held stock.
Is this part of an economic evolution? Perhaps so, but the German banks are
under intense political pressure 3 from forces not unlike those in the United
States that historically disabled powerful financial intermediaries. German
123. John Dornberg, The Spreading Might of Deutsche Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990, at 28
(reporting impulse among Social Democrats and market-oriented Free Democrats to reduce banks' power);
Ferdinand Protzman, Mighty German Banks Face Curb, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1989, at Dl, DI (reporting
that "parliament has begun studying steps to limit the banks' shareholdings, their seats on boards and their
influence in corporate decision-making."); Terence Roth, West German Banks Face Threat of Reduced
Influence in Industry: Bonn Wll Consider Rules to Curb Their Holdings and Seats in Boardrooms, WALL
ST. J., July 18, 1989, at A20, A20 (reporting that "[w]ith main stream politics coming into play, bankers
worry that they'll be forced to sell parts of their sizable equity holdings in West German industry, thus
threatening their dominant position in the country's equity markets.").
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politicians claim that the bankers' power clashes with the German "social
order."'124 Parliamentary reports attack the banks. Members of Parliament
desire to limit "the percentage of equity a bank could maintain in a nonbank
enterprise and cut the number of supervisory board positions a bank executive
could hold,"'l and look to the American Bank Holding Company Act for
guidance.126 Managers are said to want to get bankers out of supervisory
boards, although they hesitate to say so publicly.27 Executives in Germany's
mid-sized firms oppose bankers' influence and want laws prohibiting German
banks from owning nonbank stock. 2 8 Fear of powerful banks "form[s] the
backdrop of many economic and political discussions. Conducted in the press,
on radio, and on television, among scholars, and, most importantly, political
groups, these discussions use emotion-laden terms such as 'bankocracy,'
'dominion of finance capital,' and similar verbal symbols."'29
The banks have bowed to this political pressure, at least verbally.130
After German politicians lit a storm of political protest in the region where a
bank-propelled takeover target operated, the bankers lowered their public
profile. 131 Moreover, Deutsche Bank, Germany's largest bank, has stated that
124. Hans-Jacob Kriimmel, German Universal Banking Scrutinized: Some Remarks Concerning the
Gessler Report, 4 J. BANKING & FIN. 33 (1980); see also Der Herr des Geldes [The Money Man], DER
SPIEGEL, Mar. 13, 1989, at 20; Die Geheimrdte der Nation [The Nation's Secret Council],
INDUSTRIEMAGAZIN, Apr. 1987, at 27; Horst Greiffenberg, Die Macht der Banken [The Power of the
Banks], VERBRAUCHERPOLITISCHE HEFrE, Dec. 1987, at 85; Jorg Huffschmid, Demokratische Alternativen
derBankpolitik [DemocraticAlternativesfor the Politics ofBanking], VERBRACHERPOLITISCHE HEF'E, Dec.
1987, at 111; Zwischen Bonn und Banken: Finanzdiplomat Hermann Abs [Between Bonn and the Banks:
Financial Diplomat Hermann Abs], DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 3, 1965, at 10.
125. Dornberg, supra note 123, at 28.
126. Wolfram Eckstein, The Role of the Banks in Corporate Concentration in West Germany, 136
ZEITSCHRiFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFr [J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL EcON.] 467,480
(1980) (Eckstein was Secretary General of the Monopoly Commission); see also Johannes Kdndgen, Duties
of Banks in Voting Their Clients' Stock I 1 (July 1992) (unpublished conference paper, on file with author)
(discussing parliamentary hearings of the committee for economic affairs).
127. Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Das Machtgeflecht der Banken Lichten, FRANKFURTER ALLGE.IEINE
ZEITUNG, Aug. 22, 1989, at 10 (leading German politician says senior managers privately tell him that they
wish to see banker power reduced). When takeovers became a real possibility, however, German managers
reconsidered.
128. Bundersverband mittelstlndischer Wirtschaf, Expose zur "Macht der Banken" 9 (Apr. 24, 1991)
(unpublished results of survey conducted by German association of mid-sized businesses, on file with
author). Eighty-eight percent of the businesses favor restricting the banks. Obviously mid-sized business
opposition could reflect interest group opposition to banker power.
129. H.E. Btischgen, The Universal Banking System in the Federal Republic of Germany, 2 J. Co\1P.
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 1, 25 (1979).
130. Krtimmel, supra note 124, at 53 (stating that bankers "continue with their traditional tendency
to elude public controversy by a flexible attitude and not to rise against the zeitgeist, even if they are
convinced they have the better arguments"); Die FDP will die Mineraldlsteuer erh~ihen stdrken,
FRANKFURTER ALLOEMEINE ZEITUNG, Aug. 19, 1989, at II (leading German politicians form working
group to curb banker power and some expect the banks to understand that prudent self-limitation is
necessary); Fusion doch ohne Beschluss zur Bankenmacht, FRANKFURTER ALLEGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Sept.
7, 1989 at 17-18.
131. "Once the [target's] employees protested the [proposed] deal, the politicians in southem Germany,
where [the target] is based, began to send up a hue and cry [which caused Deutsche Bank to change its
position and opposed the merger.]" Jackey Gold, M&A Continental Style, FIN. WORLD, Mar. 5, 1991, at
37, 37.
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the political costs are too great to maintain high visibility in corporate
governance--either as an owner or as a director.132 To dampen public
protest, which German bankers may believe managers could use to get
American-style legal restrictions, German banks have lowered their public
profile and announced that they will not fight curbs on their control over the
proxy machinery.133 While German banks do not seem to be withdrawing
from stock ownership yet, they may well be starting to use their stock less
aggressively. Political pressures, not just economic evolution, account for some
of this laxness.
True, this German "populism" has historically been weaker than the
American strain: "Germany has never known anything like the fear and
resentment that monopoly used to arouse in the United States. . . .Many
Germans find it difficult to believe that something growing up without order
and control, like a competitive market, could not be improved by applying a
little discipline."' 4 In America, antibank sentiments combined with powerful
interest groups-small bankers or managers, for example-to produce laws
restricting large banks, giving deposit insurance to small banks, and protecting
managers from takeovers. The restraints on German banks, in contrast, are
informal and self-imposed, designed to avoid formal restrictions. Why doesn't
Germany enact the formal restrictions anyway, if the popular sentiment and the
interest group motivations are there? Relative weakness of the sentiment and
motive is only part of the answer. Political structure and different formal limits
are also important. The German political structure dilutes the political effect
of both anti-big-bank popular opinion and anti-big-bank interest groups.
German citizens vote for a party which, based on its percentage of the national
vote, gets a proportionate number of Parliamentary seats.'35 The party is
more important than the candidate. Local bankers and managers (and their
campaign contributions) play a less important role in German elections than
they do in U.S. congressional elections.
136
132. Role of the Financial Services Sector: Hearings Before the Task Force on the International
Competitiveness of U.S. Financial Institutions of the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 164-65 (1990). As of 1990, this statement is reflected more in Deutsche Bank's rhetoric than its
action, insofar as concerns its ownership blocks in Germany's 100 largest firms, which have been
increasing, not decreasing. See Table VI.
133. Friedrich K. Kiibler, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 57
BROOK. L. REV. 97 (1991). American institutional restraint is similar. California's huge state pension fund
apparently fears that "an organized Calpers-backed attempt to force management changes could trigger a
reaction that could curb the big fund's freedom to act independently," in a fashion similar to the restraints
arising from the 1980's takeovers. Smith, supra note 119, at A3.
134. HENRY C. WALLICH, MAINSPRINGS OF THE GERMAN REVIVAL 136-37 (1955).
135. LEWIS J. EDINGER, WEST GERMAN POLITICS 119-20, 149, 172 & n.6 (1986).
136. Id. at 148 (stating that power of political parties "discourag[es] interest associations from
supporting independent deputies and [strengthens] cohesion within the parliamentary parties. The leaders
... can use the threat of expulsion to keep dissidents in line...").
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Moreover, popular opinion and interest groups do formally shape the
German boardroom and dilute the power of the German banks, through
codetermination. It injects employees-white collar, blue collar, and union-
represented-into the boardrooms of the largest German firms, now giving
them half of the supervisory board's seats not due to private contract-making
or purely economic evolution, but due to the way the German Parliament
settled political conflict. Codetermination is a counterweight to capital-the
historical origins of codetermination are rooted in the German Parliament's
efforts to co-opt revolutionary forces after the German revolution of 1918.137
Parliament expanded codetermination thereafter, most recently in 1976 when
it sought to pacify unions after a wave of strikes in the 1970's.' While I
am unaware of a probing political analysis of Germany's expansion of
codetermination in 1976, I doubt that either popular opinion concerning the
banks or the interest group influence of the German unions was irrelevant.
While American politics fragmented capital and labor, German politics brought
them together in the boardroom.
Codetermination has three important effects on German corporate
governance. First, codetermination makes powerful intermediaries more
politically palatable in Germany than they have been in America, because the
employees are in the boardroom as a counterweight.
Second, codetermination affects the mechanisms of corporate governance
by, for example, impeding takeovers. In the 1980's the rise of a takeover
market in America induced popular fears that takeovers would disrupt
employment. Antitakeover laws were the result, making takeovers more
difficult. German codetermination has a similar effect; takeovers that would
disrupt employment are difficult because the shareholders can never capture the
entire supervisory board.
Third, codetermination affects and changes corporate governance in the
supervisory board. Obviously, it impedes powerful intermediaries from pushing
for rapid organizational change that would disrupt employment. More
generally, bankers know that a powerful supervisory board enhances the
authority of the employees. My understanding is that the bankers have thus
sought to weaken the supervisory board, the arena where the employees are,
while hoping that the managerial board will act as the bankers wish, perhaps
after direct consultation with the shareholding institutions.'39
The rhetoric of banker withdrawal from the boardroom should be
considered with codetermination in mind. What if banks feared that the
governance task ahead in Germany is to tighten the belts and salary levels of
highly-paid German workers? They might plausibly have concluded that the
137. Thomas Raiser, The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, 36 AM. J.
Comp. L. 111, 117 (1988).
138. Alan Hyde, A Theory of Labor Legislation, 38 BuFF. L. REV. 383, 411-12 (1990).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
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German political climate would not allow the bankers a visible role in firing
employees or lowering their salaries. Prudence would dictate a lowered profile.
History helps explain the German boardroom and the powerful German
banks in another way. After Bismarck unified Germany, he sought to develop
German industry by creating great banks as engines of development. 4 ' A
statist political system facilitated a central bank that provided liquidity to the
German banks' long-term investments. 4 ' These banks naturally expected to
oversee the investments made with funds they lent and thus involved
themselves in corporate governance. Happenstance helped propel the banks'
stock power. The newly unified German state taxed transfers of securities.
Stock owners wanted to avoid the taxes; German banks held customers' stock
in the banks' name and issued receipts to the retail owners. Then, when one
customer sold stock to another customer, the banks argued that no taxable
transfer occurred, because a bank was still the record owner. The taxing
authorities agreed. Thereafter, stock owners preferred to deposit stock with
bigger banks, which could best match customers' sales and purchases,' 4 thus
giving banks control over the proxy machinery.
One last aspect of German political history is relevant. For the nineteenth
and most of the first half of the twentieth century, democratic politics and its
fragmenting tendencies could not affect German intermediaries because
Germany was not a democratic nation. This is not to say that financial power
necessarily clashes with a democratic political system-democracies have
concentrated industries and can also have concentrated intermediaries-but it
does mean that the democratic features fragmenting American financial
institutions from the nineteenth century to today have had less time to affect
German intermediaries.
Similarly, the history of German corporate governance is also partly a
transmission of government directions through the bank regulators to the large
banks, which implement the directions and get financial protection from the
government. (Japanese and German corporate governance and regulation are
somewhat similar in this respect.) This statist structure, while again not
necessarily at odds with democratic politics in general, is at odds with
140. ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 14-15
(1962).
141. Richard Tilly, Banking Institutions in Historical Perspective: Germany, Great Britain and the
United States in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century, 145 ZErrSCHRIFr FOR DIE GESAMTE
STAATSWISSENSCHAFT [J. INSTITuTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON.] 189-209 (1989). While bank-driven
industrialization went forward in Germany, the Bank of England would not provide that kind of liquidity
to British banks. Id. And due to Andrew Jackson's populist-inspired veto of the rechartering of the Second
Bank of the United States, the U.S. in the nineteenth century had no central bank to provide bank liquidity,
inducing them to shun long-term, illiquid investments.
142. See generally J. RIESSER, THE GREAT GERMAN BANKS AND THEIR CONCENTRATION, S. Doc.
No. 593, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 618-620 (1911). Riesser does not say whether the large banks lobbied for
the tax result. The tax also stunted a German securities market. Richard H. Tilly, German Banking, 1850-
1914: Development Assistance for the Strong, 15 J. EUROPEAN ECON. HIST. 113, 126-27 (1986).
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American democratic history and its impulse to fragment both concentrations
of private economic power and centralized political power.
B. Japanese Interest Groups
Before World War II, the largest firms in Japan were the zaibatsu, which
resembled the U.S. conglomerates of the 1960's but with family ownership, not
public ownership, at the top. The zaibatsu were tightly connected to large
banks but the family controlled the banks, which resembled.German universal
banks in their use of long-term loans and equity positions. 4 3 In 1943, the
Japanese military disrupted the system by ordering managers at munitions
manufacturers to follow bureaucratic orders rather than shareholder directives
and by directing munitions firms to choose a main bank to facilitate the
auditing of wartime production.' 44 In 1948, orders from the Supreme
Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP) destroyed that corporate system with
directives to break up the zaibatsu, to distribute their stock, and to prohibit
bank ownership of big blocks of stock 145 stemming from the "American
belief that [democracy] not only required free elections, free speech, and due
process .... but also the Glass-Steagall Act."' 146 Little else better shows law
determining corporate structure than law imposed by a military dictatorship in
1943 or law imposed by an occupying military power in 1948.
SCAP prohibited Japanese banks from owning more than 5% of another
firm's stock, foreshadowing the American Bank Holding Company Act of
1956. But international politics-communism in China and war in Korea-and
fear of Japanese domestic instability changed SCAP's primary goal from
pacifying a defeated enemy to building a stable economic ally. So SCAP
loosened its grip and decided not to pursue full fragmentation; it watched as
Japan fostered close relations between finance and industry. During the
following decades, stock relentlessly moved from individuals to banks and
insurers, and cross-ownership bound finance and industry together.
Military directives-a type of law-deeply affected modem Japanese
firms' ownership structure. The wartime Japanese military orders were
practical in origin, but had some anti-capitalist ideology behind them.
American occupation orders to force Glass-Steagall rules on the Japanese were
not designed for the efficient operation of financial markets and the
143. WILLIAM M. Tstrrsui, BANKING POLICY IN JAPAN 5, 11 (1988).
144. AOKI, supra note 82, at 37.
145. See generally J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of
Defection in Japan, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 91, 99-100 & n.21 (1991) (comparing Japanese and U.S. banking
regulation).
146. David G. Litt, Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller & Edward L. Rubin, Politics,
Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets: Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United
States and Japan, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 369, 380 (1990).
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development of sound corporate structures, but to inculcate democracy,' 47
and the weaknesses now emerging in Japanese intermediaries are thus partly
the delayed result of American democratic ideology.148 Oddly enough,
American ideology also accounts for why the Japanese banks were not further
weakened and were allowed to keep their large size. SCAP initially planned
to dissolve the big banks and end nation-wide branching, but changed its mind.
The American occupation bureaucracy thought that dissolving the zaibatsu was
more important than dissolving the banks; since SCAP's antitrust analysis
found that nine big banks and a fringe of smaller banks provided adequate
competition, it thought the American model of financial fragmentation was
inapt and thus forced the adoption of only Glass-Steagall but not
McFadden.
49
Although SCAP failed to fragment Japanese finance fully, it did break up
the zaibatsu, limit bank stock ownership to 5%, and segment commercial from
investment banking. The incompleteness of financial fragmentation meant that,
with subtlety, the Japanese could-and did-overcome the American-imposed
Glass-Steagall rules-by keeping their banks big, by not adopting American
passivity rules, and by channeling postwar credit through the banking system.
This they did; with neither interest groups nor populism to block such efforts,
the political task was easy. But now, in the 1990's, the banks are doing the
heavy lifting in corporate ownership, and the weakening of banks puts the
system under pressure. Some of these current stresses on banks are delayed
reactions to restrictions imposed by U.S. occupation. 15  Although Japan
effectively repealed American efforts at fragmentation by channeling credit
through banks, such a system cannot continue in the 1990's. Thus, the
American-imposed segmentation pressures Japanese financial intermediaries
today in ways it did not in prior decades. If this weakness leads banks to sell
their stock, it could change the structure of ownership and authority in the
large firm.
To preserve concentrated ownership, Japan could restructure its
intermediaries, but fights among interest groups have stymied a complete
147. See, e.g., id. at 379-80.
148. Occupation authorities in Germany imposed McFadden, although German authorities viewed it
as unwise. When the occupation ended, Germany allowed geographically fragmented banks to merge, which
they did. TsuTsuI, supra note 143, at 55-56; Rolf Ziegler et al., Industry and Banking in the German
Corporate Network, in NETWORKS OF CORPORATE POWER: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TEN COUNTRIES
91, 106 (Frans N. Stokman et al. eds., 1985); Hans A. Adler, The Post-War Reorganization of the German
Banking System, 63 Q.J. ECON. 322 (1949).
149. TsurSUI, supra note 143, at 41-43 (zaibatsu focus); id. 45-48, 63, 117 (incomplete
fragmentation); id. at 49-53 (SCAP plans to dissolve large banks); id. at 52, 119 (MacArthur decides banks
are secondary).
150. Current Bank of International Settlements capital standards make bank stockholding more
difficult. Japanese savers and corporate borrowers now have access to nonbank alternatives. Interest rates,
previously depressed by the government, are reaching market levels. The American Structural Impediments
Initiative seeks to fray the equity ties inside the keiretsu.
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restructuring.' 5 Securities firms see bank underwriting of securities by
commercial banks as dangerous; 52 commercial bankers, not surprisingly, see
no danger.153 The best history of modern financial regulation in Japan sees
interest group infighting, not arguments over the best means of achieving
efficiency, as explaining the bureaucracies' slowness in deregulation:
[T]he walls that have divided various types of financial institutions
since World War II still stand, because of the tenacity of entrenched
interests.... City banks, for example, will be barred from making
long-term loans in the Euroyen market until the long-term credit
banks and trust banks receive suitable compensation, such as
expanded securities powers. . . . It is the political power of these
various groups rather than economic rationale that protects
them ....
Thus, the newly-weakened Japanese commercial banks may be unable to
prevent ownership fragmentation unless they get new authority, which the
American-created interest groups so far impede. If full fragmentation does
occur in Japan, politics-this time, interest group politics-will play some role.
While securities firms want to preserve one part of the current system-
segmentation-managers want to preserve another part-cross-holdings, which
protect them from takeovers and usually give them large friendly shareholders.
If banks cannot continue their role in the keiretsu, managers want a substitute,
not the unknown. Their representatives argue that "any hard-landing approach
which restricts ... cross-holding... risk[s] ... demolishing the base of [the]
Japanese management systems, and will never be accepted by a national
consensus and must be avoided by all means."'
155
Political history affects why the American and Japanese banking systems
look so different. A half-century ago, both Japan and America faced bank
151. See ZIELINSKI & HoLLowVAY, supra note 80, at 70 (stating that post-retirement-at 55-jobs keep
some Ministry of Finance officials attuned to interests of banks, others to that of brokers); Elliot Gewirtz
& Clark Taber, Fundamental Issues in Japanese Financial System Reform, 7 REV. BANKING & FIN.
SERVICES 135, 141 (1991); Litt, Macey, Miller & Rubin, supra note 146, at 404-22 (describing conflict
between Japanese bankers and brokers concerning banks' underwriting of commercial paper); James
Sterngold, A Japanese-Style "Old Boy" Network, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1991, at Dl (discussing efforts of
Ministry of Finance to resolve conflict between bankers and brokers concerning decision to allow banks
into securities business).
152. [Japanese] Securities and Exchange Council, How Basic System Regarding Capital Market Ought
to be Reformed 17-18 (June 19, 1991) (unpublished report, on file with author).
153. [Japanese] Financial System Research Council, On a New Japanese Finance System (June 25,
1991) (unpublished report, on file with author).
154. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 79, at 94-95.
155. Foundation for Advanced Information and Research, Japan, A Perspective on Japanese Merger
& Acquisition from International Viewpoint 23 (Sept. 1990) (unpublished report, on file with author)
(emphasis added); see also RYUTARO KOMIYA, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: TRADE, INDUSTRY, AND
GOVERNMENT 255-56 (1990); Gerlach, supra note 33, at 117 (describing Japanese executives as opposed
to stopping cross-holding). Changes in Japan's pension funds may create a huge emerging pool of capital.
RoSENBLUTH, supra note 79, at 75. Whether intermediaries or managers control these funds may determine
the future of Japanese corporate governance.
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crises. Politics led each nation to react differently. Japan then had thousands
of small banks. Japan also lacked a populist, antibank ethos.'5 6 During the
1927 economic crisis, many small banks were badly run and failed, while the
large ones were fairly well-run and stable. Depositors ran off to the
government's savings system, the large banks survived, and the government
encouraged mergers among the small banks, 157 concentrating banking. Today,
Japan no longer has thousands of small banks.
In 1933, America had a similar banking crisis and a different political
result. The United States, like Japan, had thousands of small banks. When
many of them faced collapse in 1933, they pressed Congress for federal
deposit insurance at the same time Glass-Steagall separation was on the
agenda. The interest-group impetus for extensive deposit insurance has been
the political power of small country banks. They got it enacted,' extended,
and beat back attempts to get it under control.159 Without it, American
banking would have become more concentrated as many deposits would have
run off from small, weak country banks to larger, often stronger, money-center
banks. 160  Recognizing this, the large banks supported Glass-Steagall
separation because in 1933 they were not making money in the securities
business and they hoped this support would deter deposit insurance. 16' The
large banks miscalculated, however, and Congress, after passing the Glass-
Steagall Act, also passed deposit insurance, which to this day continues to prop
156. T.A. BISSON, ZAIBATSU DISSOLUTION IN JAPAN 29 (1954) (quoting U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
PUB. No. 2628, REPORT OF THE MISSION ON JAPANESE COMBINES, FAR EASTERN SERIES 21 (1946))
("Since the [Meiji] restoration .... [t]here has never been any movement in Japan strong enough to
produce a Sherman Act,... a Money Trust Investigation, a Federal Trade Commission, or a Securities and
Exchange Commission such as developed in the United States .... ).
157. Frances Rosenbluth, Bank Consolidation in Prewar Japan: The Market for Regulation under a
Non-Sovereign Diet 10-14, 17-25 (Mar. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
158. Carter H. Golembe, The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of its
Antecedents and its Purposes, 76 POL. SCI. Q. 181 (1960); see also Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Deposit
Insurance in Theory and Practice, in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION: POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR THE
FUTURE 165 (Catherine England & Thomas Huertas eds., 1988) and sources cited therein; cf. Donald C.
Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal
Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 695-97 (1987).
159. Kenneth H. Bacon, White House Bill on Bank Law Reform Faces Hurdles as It Goes to House
Panel, VALL ST. J., May 14, 1991, at A24 (reporting Independent Bankers Association's attempts to head
off Treasury effort to limit deposit insurance coverage). Some deposit insurance for the poor and middle-
class is socially desirable and could explain a down-sized system, but cannot explain the extensive system
America has. See generally Robert C. Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1
(1976).
160. Some strength of large money-center banks came from being "too big to fail," meaning that the
government-in modem times the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Federal Reserve-would
prevent the failure of any really big bank.
161. Langevoort, supra note 158, at 690-91; cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups
Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 2 (1984).
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up thousands of small banks. 162 Politics subsidized the small banks, and the
United States still has thousands of them.
A populist, antibank ethos is historically absent in Japan.'63 Like
Germany, this was partly because until the postwar era Japan was not a
democratic country where such opinions could much influence government
decisions. But consider the current turmoil in the Japanese economy. One
problem facing Japan is that many firms are in mature product markets and
have substantial free cash flow, which the firms can retain, freeing themselves
from the bankers, who first gained influence because they were the necessary
providers of now unneeded cash. Two tests of the current structure now loom:
First, will stockholding banks keep their stock and will they induce portfolio
firms to use the cash well? Second, if the banks succeed but make managers
and workers unhappy, say, by ending lifetime employment, a major test of the
political theory would arise. In America the disadvantaged groups would try
to shift decisionmaking from the market to the political arena, appealing to the
legislature to re-do the economic result. While in Japan that appeal might fall,
politics there is not so different that we should expect disgruntled silence from
those affected. We shall see.
I make no claim to a satisfactory understanding of the political history of
Germany and Japan and its effects on financial intermediaries and corporate
structures. Although others will have to deepen and correct the history I've
presented here, even this cursory review shows that political forces have
shaped the German and Japanese corporate structures-forces that differ both
in kind and sometimes in strength from those that shaped American financial
intermediaries and American corporate governance. The point is not that the
foreign systems are less politically determined than America's. German
codetermination in the face of revolution is hardly apolitical. The Japanese
decision after 1927 to concentrate their banking system was not apolitical. The
point is that different historical politics led to different financial institutional
structures, and different institutions led to different corporate governance
structures. Today, populism in Germany weakens the power of German
bankers in the boardroom through formal codetermination and the informal
effects of popular resentment; interest group infighting in Japan and the
162. TsursuI, supra note 143, at 3-4, 11; Juro Teranishi, Financial System and the Industrialization
of Japan: 1900-1970, BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO Q. REV., Sept. 1990, at 309, 329-30; Juro
Teranishi, Availability of Safe Assets and the Process of Bank Concentration in Japan, 25 ECON. DEv. &
CULTURAL CHANGE, Apr. 1977, at 447,448-49,462,465, 469. Moreover, even earlier, after a bond failure
in the nineteenth century, the Ministry of Finance sought to make banking somewhat more concentrated.
Gary Saxonhouse, Mechanisms for Technology Transfer in Japanese Economic History, 12 MANAGERIAL
& DECISION ECON. 83, 85 (1991) (citing 1 NIHON GINKO HYAKUNEN SHI (A HUNDRED YEAR HISTORY OF
THE BANK OF JAPAN (1982)).
163. BISSON, supra note 156, at 29.
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American-imposed legacy of partial fragmentation limit the power of Japanese
bankers in industry.
V. SHARED AuTHoRrrY: WEAKNESSES AND STRENGTHS
My primary goal in this Article is to show that there are differences in
corporate structure, that the German and Japanese structures would be illegal
in the United States, and that existing corporate theories, which focus on
economic factors and do not consider political forces, cannot adequately
explain the differences. My goal in this Part is first to find the ways in which
German and Japanese corporate governance structures resemble each other,
while departing from the American structure, and then to develop hypotheses
for future investigation about the link between structure and performance.
I realize that readers of a competitiveness symposium would prefer that I
offer a corporate governance silver bullet to cure whatever economic ills afflict
American industry. My goal here is more modest. It is not to show that the
foreign structures are superior, and hence should be adopted here. Indeed, my
essential claim is not that the foreign structures are superior, but that they are
different. Moreover, prescriptions for America can be best discerned by
examining American corporate governance. Any governance feature that would
improve American corporate governance would make American firms more
competitive. There is no reason to confine a normative inquiry to features of
the foreign firms.
Were this Article not part of a competitiveness symposium, I would not
include a prominent normative section because the current data is far too thin
to make concrete recommendations based on the foreign systems. Anyone
advocating that some feature in a foreign system be adopted here would have
to respond to criticism focusing on the feature's cost, and we lack the data
necessary to evaluate the relative magnitudes of benefits and costs.
I doubt that corporate governance-even if we knew how to achieve the
perfect system-is central to economic performance and competitiveness.
Macroeconomic policies, competition, industry structure, and the education and
motivation of managers and employees each surely affect competitiveness and
productivity more than does corporate governance. Good performance abroad
will be difficult to trace to corporate governance; and conversely, poor
performance abroad does not mean that foreign governance is worse.I
14
164. Thus one might point to America's competitive superiority after World War H, as is pointed out
in Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE
LJ. 2021 (1993), when the U.S. had, more or less, the same corporate governance system then as it does
now. So, one might argue, let's ignore corporate governance as a possible American weakness. There were
many reasons for America's relative competitive superiority over Germany and Japan in 1945. It is logically
possible that America's corporate governance was bad then and bad now, but because governance is a
tertiary economic feature, it didn't drag down the American economy. Similarly, as I argue below, it is
possible that American corporate governance is, overall, superior to foreign corporate governance now, and
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Moreover, the foreign systems begin with several obvious defects.
Japanese cross-ownership and German bank proxy control are afflicted with
deep conflicts of interest, which could deteriorate into mutual managerial self-
protection in Japan and opportunism in Germany. Neither foreign system is
likely to yield entrepreneurial leadership; committees are not entrepreneurs, and
the foreign institutional allocation of capital seems to do poorly in financing
new entrepreneurial firms. Both foreign systems are associated with heavy state
direction, which has tended not to work well in the United States, and may yet
prove to work poorly abroad. My goal therefore is not to show that the foreign
systems have an overall superiority, but to find theoretical benefits that might
offset the foreign structures' obvious costs.
Any normative inquiry also suffers from the fact that Japanese, and
perhaps German, firms may maximize size, not profits. 65 Because one-third
of the cross-holdings in Japan are held, not by financial institutions, but by
industrial firms, which are as interested in their own sales as in profits from
owning stock, and because employees' representatives make up half of the
German board and are as interested in jobs as in profits, belt-tightening and
down-sizing would not be easy. If so, the foreign systems may work well
when economic determinants impel expansion, but not when expansion is no
longer warranted. The U.S. system may be more adaptable and, when the
pluses and minuses are added up, superior. For example, American managers
own more stock and America's efforts at pay-for-performance (despite how
badly it is implemented here) may motivate management better than German
or Japanese approaches. The primary theoretical advantage in the foreign
structures-institutions with very large blocks of stock whose agents interact
regularly with management-may disappear in the future if American
intermediaries continue to concentrate their holdings and become more active.
One last problem afflicts the normative inquiry. How can an increase in
banker power reduce managerial agency costs without increasing banker
agency costs? Empowering financial institutions may improve the performance
of owners' agents in the corporation, but, by expanding the duties of the
owners' agents in the financial institution, create new problems. Measuring
whether the gains exceed the losses will be hard. But, perhaps a reduction in
agency costs is not the central problem that institutional ownership addresses.
Indeed, more than corporate governance-the agency problems of managers
arising from fragmented stock ownership-is affected by the structure of large
firm ownership. The problems that institutional stockholding in a flatter
was even then. But that should not stop us from looking at foreign ownership structure to see if it offers
any lessons for America. I see no reason why we should not try to take the incremental gains and leave
behind the losses, if we can.
165. Alan S. Blinder, Profit Maximization and International Competition, in 5 FIN. & INT'L ECON.:
AMEX BANK REv. PRIZE ESSAYS 37 (Richard O'Brien ed., 1991).
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hierarchy might mitigate fall into three categories: problems in management;
problems in financial markets; and problems in organizing large scale industry.
A. Problems with Management
Contrary to conventional wisdom, bank ownership abroad did not shift
control from managers to banks, but led to power-sharing. Day-to-day banker-
shareholders do not run the firm; they intervene in crises and may hold
managers accountable in the interim. Managers presumably try to avoid those
crises and the threats these blocks bring to their own autonomy. Second,
several intermediaries usually hold big blocks of stock in large firms-no one
intermediary dominates. Third, the intermediaries are highly leveraged
institutions that cannot afford to make a serious error. Fourth, the stockholder
is personified, changing the way managers view owners. Fifth, shared authority
allows more people from different organizations into decisions at the top,
reducing inbred decisionmaking.
1. Increasing Accountability
Although reducing agency costs may not be the key advantage, if there is
one, to the foreign systems, increased accountability should not be overlooked.
American managers have historically been less accountable to shareholders
than their foreign counterparts, 166 despite big gaps in foreign accountability.
While the trend may be toward less accountability abroad and more
accountability here, differences still exist.
Thus, a first hypothesis is that the German and Japanese corporate
structure motivates the board to be more conscientious. The German and
Japanese CEO must meet with the representatives of big stockholders who do
not always owe their positions to the CEO, but owe them to their home
institutions, and who do not depend financially or socially on the CEO, a
dependence that afflicts American directors. 167 In Germany, managers, who
handle day-to-day matters, interact with institutional stockholders when
reporting to the supervisory board of directors in regular, formal meetings.
German bank directors, unlike some American directors, are not appointed to
the board because they have a reputation for passivity, but frequently because
their institutions vote big blocks of stock. And in Japan, managers dominate
the internal board that handles day-to-day matters but interact with big
stockholders in regular, informal Presidents' Council meetings. Key members
166. Cf. Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence,
39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 898-916 (1992) (discussing gaps in American accountability).
167. JAY LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S
CORPORATE BOARDS (1989); Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REv. 597, 598 (1982).
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of the supervisory board and the informal Presidents' Council owe their
allegiance to their own institutions and thus have reason not to follow the CEO
blindly. Moreover, because the CEO cannot join the German supervisory board
and faces several big stockholders in the Japanese Presidents' Council, the
CEO is not able to co-opt the external monitors completely. Thus, in both
foreign nations, managers dominate an internal board, but not the external
supervisory board or the Presidents' Council. In America, in contrast, corporate
governance involves only a single board, which the CEO has historically
dominated.
Although neither foreign meeting structure facilitates a detailed review of
senior managers-German supervisory boards meet a few times per year,
usually without a searching agenda, and Japanese monthly Presidents' Council
meetings involve so many firms that no one firm will usually be the focus of
attention-these meeting structures are fit for crisis management and big-
picture, ongoing review. Hence, even though foreign CEO's are not subject to
day-to-day direction from institutional investors, as is sometimes thought, they
are weakly accountable to institutions whose continuing involvement makes
them knowledgeable about the CEO's business. Managers get their chance, and
the intermediaries intervene primarily when managers fail. Certainly data on
executive turnover shows that German and Japanese ownership does not deter
removal of executives when performance slackens;'68  involuntary
resignations increase when the Japanese economy weakens. 169 This belies
assertions that the big stockholders insulate managers from removal. The
question remains whether these removals are fast enough or occur in the right
circumstances, and whether the removals actually improve corporate
performance. Large stockholders' ongoing involvement means they do not need
time to move up from the bottom of a learning curve and can intervene quickly
when crises hit. Finally, the potential for institutional interruption in crisis
should improve firm performance as managers try to avoid those crises. 7 '
2. Monitoring by Multiple Intermediaries
German and Japanese firms usually have several intermediaries holding big
blocks' of stock. Multiple intermediaries can (1) deter opportunism by
monitoring one another; (2) impel action in a way that a single blockholder
might not; and (3) facilitate power sharing, not domination. Rarely does a
168. See Kaplan & Minton, supra note 36; Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executives, Turnover and Firm
Performance in Germany (Feb. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
169. See supra notes 36-37.
170. These elements of shared authority comport with agency theory, which suggests that organizations
can separate some management and control functions internally by (1) using a hierarchy in which a
subordinate initiates and a superior ratifies and monitors; (2) using a board that seriously reviews top
managers; and (3) mutual monitoring across decisionmakers. Jensen & Smith, supra note 8, at 101.
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single dominant bank own a control block. Thus, the foreign structures do not
replace an American-style commanding CEO with a foreign-style commanding
bank officer.
a. Multiple Blocks Checking Each Other
A single bank in control of a firm could charge an above-market interest
rate, compel the firm to do fee-generating deals, divert value from the firm to
itself, or pursue its own empire-building agenda.' 7 ' First, because each
system tends to have multiple intermediaries-Deutsche Bank's dominating
28% block of Daimler-Benz is exceptional-the risk of bank opportunism is
diminished (although hardly eliminated). German firms usually borrow from
several banks and German loan rates are said not to include a premium for
banker control; 172 Japanese firms occasionally end their relationship with the
main bank and seek another.173 To form a coalition, the bank must appeal to
the others. That appeal may be opportunistic, but the multiple parties involved
give managers the chance to break an opportunistic coalition. Since the
managers control some stock in the financial institution, they have a base upon
which to build a counter-coalition to oppose the opportunist. A true managerial
crisis inside the firm, however, should unite the stockholders-all want to end
the crisis-but the opportunist may have trouble acting alone.
74
b. Multiple Blocks Impelling Action
Why don't American financial intermediaries-some of which can own
some stock-go to the law's limits in stockholding? Isolated blocks, even big
ones with 5% of the portfolio firm, are precarious because management may
isolate, outmaneuver, and destroy them. 75 In America, a single 5% block
does emerge here and there, but managers still have the upper hand in times
of conflict. Even a half-dozen institutions with 5% blocks would have to
coordinate their activities, which U.S. securities regulation historically deterred.
171. See Stuart Rosenstein & David Rush, The Stock Performance of Corporations That Are Partially
Owned by Other Corporations, 13 J. FIN. REs. 39 (1990).
172. John Cable, Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of West German
Banks, 95 ECON. J. 118, 118-19 (1985); see also Eckstein, supra note 126, at 478.
173. Ramseyer, supra note 145; Toshiaki Tachibanaki & Atsuhiro Taki, Shareholding and Lending
Activity of Financial Institutions in Japan, 9 BANK JAPAN MONETARY & ECON. STuD. 23, 24, 31 (1991)
(reporting that one in four firms switched main banks in a four-year period).
174. Even this is not a complete explanation. Institutions might form coalitions. Banker A may agree
with Banker B that A will exploit company X while B exploits company Y. Nonetheless, such coalitions,
like cartels, are often difficult to construct and to maintain. Moreover, bankers should fear that visible
opportunism will provoke political retaliation, particularly in Germany. Politics constrains.
175. Large stock positions in big American firms are rare. One example was H. Ross Perot's 6% stake
in GM. Perot gained access to the GM Boardroom, but when the GM managers discovered that he was a
feisty critic, they threw him out. Perot was not able to form an alliance with other large stockholders
because there were no others. See Table I.
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Thus, some "unleashed" American institutions should rationally refuse to hold
the maximum permitted by American law because they know that in times of
crisis they will need a critical mass of other large blockholders, a critical mass
they lack.
The ownership structures in both Germany and Japan have weaknesses in
impelling action. The German banks' big voting blocks usually come from
brokerage stock, for which the German banks are not likely to make heroic
efforts at monitoring. 76 Each Japanese bank owns no more than 5% of an
industrial firm's stock, a position that is frequently too weak to wrest control
from managers in the United States. A German bank's typical directly-owned,
nonbrokerage position, while larger, is usually too small standing alone to give
the bank control; with brokerage stock or alliances with other stockholders, the
bank can obtain control.
Multiple blocks may induce intermediaries to act in a way that a single
isolated blockholder might not. The multiple blocks may solve the weakness
problem, without creating a dominating block that recentralizes authority in a
dominbting intermediary. The roles of German brokerage stock and of multiple
Japanese 5% blocks may not be to share expense with the active intermediary,
but to give voting power. Directly-owned stock gives the institutional owner
a financial incentive to act; ancillary, backup stock bulks up voting power to
provide the means.'77
c. Multiple Blocks and Power Sharing
If foreign intermediaries are large Berle-Means firms (actually many are
not),t7 8 they could have too many scattered shareholders to give their agents
the proper incentives. Why should reducing managerial agency costs at the
firm not just displace the problems up one level into financial intermediaries,
making bankers the source of a new agency problem?
This question may make the normative inquiry a dead end. But power
sharing differs, at least in form, from completely shifting authority from
managers to bankers. 79
176. High registration fees drive individuals' stock into banks, whose custodial fees are not tied to
performance. See BAUMS, supra note 16, at 25-27. The banks could be paid via conflicts of interest that
allow them to divert resources from the firms to themselves, presumably via favorable loan terms or high
fees for deals, but the current evidence says this does not in fact happen. Cable, supra note 172, at 119-24.
177. If political pressure on German banks leads them to reduce their amount of directly-held stock,
see supra text accompanying notes 130-133, while retaining their brokerage stock, they may face reduced
incentives to act responsibly.
178. The Japanese banks are primarily cross-owned by other Japanese financial institutions and
industrial companies; in Germany, one of the three big banks is also partly cross-owned by a large
insurance company and industrial firm.
179. Shared authority affects monitoring, a fact that is this Subsection's focus. It can also affect the
quality of decisions, the focus below. See infra text accompanying notes 185-188.
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This shared authority lies between market and hierarchy, linking finance
and industry in a complex way. Control is not the right word to describe these
relationships. Interlock, or Escher-like overlap, might be more apt.' An
Escher-like hand reaches out from the bank to control the firm, but then an
Escher-like hand reaches back from the firm to control the bank.
To see this, trace the historical authority of the Japanese banks. In their
heyday, through their control over credit, they could control firms, review their
budgets, and monitor their managers. They owned stock in the monitored
firms. rhe assets of the monitored firms included the stock of the monitoring
banks. The banks could influence firms through their stockholdings, and the
firms could influence the banks through their own stockholdings. The banks
thus were not (and are not now) precisely Berle-Means firms.
Escher-like overlap also describes corporate governance in Germany,
although less clearly. Bankers have seats on industrial firms' supervisory
boards and managers from important industrial firms are members of the
banks' boards and on the banks' informal national advisory boards.'
Moreover, managers direct employees, some of whom sit on the supervisory
board and direct managers. Corporate governance structures in both nations
resemble less a hierarchical pyramid-the American picture-than an Escher-
like staircase-while always walking downstairs, we wind up on top of the
staircase from which we started.
This interlocking, shared power model comports with the Japanese
structure in two ways. No single bank dominates a firm's stock ownership;
only a group can dominate. Moreover, groups of firms cross-own some
influential blocks of stock in the banks. This Escher-like interlock model
comports with the German structure in one way-only a coalition can
completely dominate the firm. Two of the three large German banks are,
however, themselves Berle-Means firms with scattered shareholders, a
consideration we analyze next.
3. Monitoring the Banks
Ignore cross-ownership of the banks for now-as we must for two of the
three large German banks and as we can for the Japanese banks-by
considering institutional ownership's effectiveness in another setting. How can
the banks monitor when they themselves are presumably afflicted with agency
problems? As we have said, this may make this part of the normative inquiry
a dead end. But consider the banks as embedded in a simple tri-level
180. M.C. Escher was a Dutch graphics artist with whose work most readers will be familiar. Escher's
drawings show, for example, realistic renditions of staircases that descend to the top of their own ascent
and walls that abut ceiling and floor at the same joining point.
181. Kilbler, supra note 133, at 109. The new ownership interlock between Dresdner and Allianz
strengthens the overlap.
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hierarchical monitoring model with industry at the bottom, financial institutions
in the middle, and government regulators at the top. Although the
intermediaries monitor industry, they are themselves free from day-to-day
control. So, who monitors the intermediaries? No one, day-to-day. But the
government monitors leveraged intermediaries and, when it gets a signal of
financial weakness from the banks, it begins inquiries that weaken bank
managers' autonomy.1
8 2
In this model then, banks' weakness-high leverage with thin
equity-becomes a strength, if properly regulated. Leveraging and regulation
cause the senior bank managers to get good returns and avoid financial
disasters at portfolio firms in order to avoid a thinning of the bank's own
equity, which would trigger regulatory intervention. Bank ownership increases
the accountability of managers, but without an equal and offsetting increase in
agency problems in the stock-owning bank because the leveraged bank has
financial and regulatory reasons to avoid a severe decline in its stock
portfolio.,, 3
4. Personifying Shareholders
American managers owe fiduciary duties to an abstraction, a faceless stock
market. In Germany and Japan, on the other hand, this abstraction is
personified through regular interactions with bank directors (on the supervisory
board) or the bank presidents (at the council meeting). The derelict foreign
CEO risks not just betraying abstract duties to an anonymous market, but also
betraying people from a stockholding institution. Loyalty to real people may
motivate better than legally mandated loyalty to an abstraction.
German and Japanese managers, due to constant interaction with people
from stockholding institutions, should feel greater peer pressure, guilt about
shirking, more camaraderie, and more empathy among coworkers, all of which
could improve performance.' 4 CEO's may be more willing to hurt an
anonymous stockholder, whose needs are not vivid and present, than they can
hurt a cohort. Isolated American managers, on the other hand, are likely to see
182. Cf. Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 REV. ECON.
STUD. 393 (1984); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS) 323 (1986).
183. This may seem like a problem with institutions and hence could belong to the next Section, which
discusses problems with financial markets. But it is best thought of as a problem of management
accountability that bank ownership theoretically can help, without creating equal and offsetting problems
in the upstairs institution.
184. See Eugene Kandel & Edward P. Lazear, Peer Pressure and Partnerships, 100 J. POL. ECON. 801
(1992); cf. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (though insider stockholder can mislead the market, a
face-to-face seller cannot). The risk of course is that personification leads to a failure to hold managers
accountable for their mistakes.
Sociologists found few Americans soldiers fought "for freedom," "for the American way," or "against
aggression"; motivation came not from these abstract ideals, but from loyalty to peers in the platoon and
fear of embarrassment in front of them. JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATmE 50-53, 72-73 (1976).
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shareholders, not as friendly institutions expecting a profit, but as anonymous
traders with little loyalty to the firm. American CEO's may see even the
newly-emergent institutional investors having stable but small blocks as too
distant to merit loyalty and respect-a loyalty and respect that could arise from
regular interaction in a governance or quasi-governance setting, such as in the
Presidents' Council or in interaction with the supervisory board.
5. Improving Decisions
Shared authority may increase managerial accountability, but that is not its
only potential benefit. Organizational theory suggests another reason why this
partial vertical integration may be useful. Complexity reduces an individual's
ability both to comprehend all that is necessary and to avoid bias from
outmoded experience. In a modern, complex economic system, information is
too dispersed; no individual or staff can have all of the information needed for
decisionmaking. Networks can do better, the theory goes, than any one
individual or hierarchy. Moreover, since a decisionmaker's biases are often
invisible to the decisionmaker, a single individual will do worse than a
network of decisionmaking, which reduces error, 15 similar to the way a good
law firm with many high quality people in overlapping fields can cooperate,
converse, and get the job done better than a lawyer of equal quality working
alone. Unlike the American conglomerate, foreign structures do not replace the
CEO with a new centralized decisionmaking authority. Cross-holding allows
more interested parties to participate in the decisionmaking at the top. In some
settings, wider participation may help; neither the individual CEO nor the
headquarters at the top of firms in technologically complex and fast moving
industries may be able to assimilate all the important information needed for
critical decisions.
The problems of misinformation and bias can be generalized. Market
transactions have costs; command and hierarchy replace market costs with
organizational costs. Relative cost determines organizational structure; firms
arise when a hierarchical structure provides a more efficient means of
organizing than transactions in the marketplace.186 The foreign systems
permit hybrids that could perform better than either pure type.
Changing underlying economic conditions could make hybrids more
important than they once were. Increasing complexity of information is one.
New theories of firm organization describe American-style command-and-
control hierarchy as poorly adapted to today's continual information shifts and
185. See Raaj K. Sah, Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems, 5 J. ECON. PERSP.
67, 69-71 (1991).
186. WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 82; R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Finn, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386
(1937).
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technological changes. 87 Although the pyramid of decisionmaking worked
well when mass production of slowly changing products was typical, the
difficulties of producing today's complex products in rapidly changing markets
may make a flatter authority structure at the top better.
Some cross-owned firms in Japanese keiretsu are vertically related and
would be part of a single large vertical firm in the United States. By involving
more individuals in decisionmaking at the top, the flatter authority structure
present in German and Japanese firms may serve better to motivate managers,
particularly those who would be farther from the top in the American vertically
integrated firm. Indeed, "[r]esearch suggests that hierarchical design dampens
employee motivation because individuals are.., more committed when they
have participated in a decision, and much less enthusiastic when ... ordered
by superiors to undertake a particular task."'
' 81
The incentives, sense of responsibility, status, and hence motivation of
senior managers at semi-independent keiretsu firms should differ from those
of managers who run American-style divisions or wholly-owned subsidiaries.
Keiretsu CEO's should be able to call on stockholder-financiers directly, while
division managers and subsidiary heads must first speak with their firm bosses.
Cross-ownership may also help motivate lower-level employees by
supporting the implicit lifetime employment contract that is only now
weakening in the core keiretsu firms. Although stockholders without any other
relationship to a firm will sometimes renege on an implicit agreement,
stockholder-suppliers might honor the agreement because the gains they reap
as reneging stockholders would be reduced by the losses they incur as affected
suppliers. Suppliers may fear demoralization of their own employees, who
would have to deal with some of the victims, employees of the customer-firm
who no longer benefit from lifetime employment. Also, as stockholders
involved with multiple relationships-suppliers and stockholders, creditors and
stockholders-they may avoid high variance strategies that often benefit
stockholders but hurt creditors, suppliers, customers, and employees. To protect
themselves as customers, suppliers, or creditors, cross-holding stockholders
may protect employees even if, in so doing, they decline to take risks that
would maximize the value of their stock.
187. Peter F. Drucker, The Coming of the New Organization, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 45,
53.
188. Walter W. Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 295, 319 (1990).
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B. Problems with Financial Markets: Institutions as the Problem
1. Enhancing the Information Flow
The ownership structure in Germany and Japan should improve the flow
of information from inside the firm to large shareholders, thus helping to deter
the short term propensities often seen in the stock market.'89 To do this in
the United States, managers would have to reveal complex, proprietary
information to the stock market, and derivatively to competitors.' 90
Moreover, evaluations of technical data from inside the firm may require
regular, private interaction between large stockholders and managers, which the
foreign structures provide but the American structure does not. 9'
2. Improving Loan Markets
Bankers may buy stock in their debtors to create an additional mechanism
for protecting their loans or providing a secondary information channel to
support their loans. 92 Bankers may also buy stock to limit their own
opportunism-a threat not to rollover short-term loans unless the debtor grants
concessions is less credible when carrying out the threat would reduce the
value of the stock the banks hold. Finally, because bankers tend to be
concerned with loan repayment and not with maximizing firm value, they and
their debtors may both prefer that they buy stock to mitigate their
conservatism. 93
Lastly, when creditors also have large stock positions, workouts and
recapitalizations to avoid a complicated and costly bankruptcy proceeding are
probably easier.
189. I first argued this possibility in Roe, Political Theory, supra note 1, at 55-56.
190. Bruce Atwater, the savvy CEO of General Mills, admits that he tries to learn of his competitors'
activities from analysts. Bruce Atwater, The Governance System Is Sound, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring
1991, at 17, 19. Presumably CEO's severely limit the amount of proprietary information they release to
analysts.
191. Takeo Hoshi et al., Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese
Panel Data, in ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, CORPORATE FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 105 (R. Glenn
Hubbard ed., 1990); Stephen D. Prowse, Institutional Investment Patterns and Corporate Financial
Behavior in the United States and Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 43 (1990).
192. Obviously, the influence from stock may yield the mutual self-protection that weakens the
German and Japanese systems: The stockholding bank may induce the portfolio firm to borrow on terms
unfavorable to it.
193. Insider trading helps to explain why banks buy stock, or at least what happens once they own
it, particularly in Germany, where, due to a lack of insider trading laws, bank officers can and do trade on
inside information from firms. While insider trading surely explains some stockholding, it cannot explain
all of it, because of the Japanese banks' stability in ownership (insiders have to trade to make profits), the
timing of their acquisitions (they all bought in more or less at the same time, to stabilize firms in the face
of American strength and takeover possibilities), and the uniformity of 18-20% bank ownership in the top
companies (every firm cannot be a better than average deal).
198719931
The Yale Law Journal
C. Problems in Large-Scale Industry: Organization
Credible commitment analysis helps to explain the role of cross-ownership
in Japan, where one-third of the cross-ownership of stock involves suppliers
and their customers. 94 A supplier wants protection before investing in new
machinery to make a good that only a specific customer can use. What will
stop the customer from extorting the supplier later on, after the supplier has the
machine? Although a detailed contract between the supplier and the specific
customer may protect the supplier, many of the ways that the supplier can be
exploited are unforeseeable. Vague promises from a customer to act in good
faith are often not enough. Multiple cross-holdings of stock, however, may
mitigate opportunism. If the customer tries to mulct the supplier after the
supplier has committed itself, a coalition of stockholders could intervene to
stop the opportunism. 95
A bank's investment in a long-term loan' 96 resembles a supplier's
investment in complex machinery for a specific customer. The borrower may
renege on the loan by increasing the level of risk or, as noted above, the lender
may renege by refusing to rollover the loan at a critical juncture. In the United
States, detailed loan agreements mitigate these problems. Perhaps in Japan
cross-ownership limits borrower-lender opportunism and thereby facilitates
trade in capital.
197
In both supplier-customer relationships and lender-borrower relationships,
the relational commitment is made credible by the plausibility that a coalition
will form to control the opportunist. Cross-ownership among related customers
and suppliers-whether of machinery or of capital-resembles a hostage
exchange in which each side gives the other a hostage whose loss will be
costly to the offering party but whose value to the side holding the hostage is
little. By acting opportunistically, a supplier risks not only the direct
intervention of the others but, because the supplier is bound in a web of cross-
holdings and relational investments, the supplier will devalue these other
important relationships. If a supplier acts opportunistically, the customer can
sell the supplier's stock in the market and encourage the other firms in the
cross-holding web to sell their stock in the opportunist. Such sales would hurt
managers at the opportunistic supplier, who would be "naked" and at the risk
194. Yusaku Futatsugi, What Share Cross-Holdings Mean for Corporate Management, ECON. EYE,
Spring 1990, at 17, 18. Industrial ownership of stock is also significant in Germany.
195. See Gilson & Roe, supra note 100.
196. Some of these loans may, in form, be short-term loans, particularly in Japan. When these loans
are rolledtover regularly, they effectively become long-term loans.
197. In fact, this scenario is quite complicated. If fiduciary duties are weaker and more difficult to
enforce in Japan than in America, the Japanese system may require cross-ownership to function. Thus, the
Japanese may bear the costs of cross-ownership-whatever they may be-because they lack other
mechanisms for enforcing contracts and fiduciary duties.
1988 [Vol. 102: 1927
Corporate Structure
of takeover. The selling customer recovers the market price of the stock; the
opportunist is, however, made to operate in a riskier environment. 98
Relational contracting problems may overlap with corporate governance
problems. Multiple relationships, such as suppliers and customers owning each
other's stock and trading goods, and lenders and borrowers owning each
other's stock and trading loans, double up (1) the sources of information; (2)
the incentives to participate in the governance of the firm, since a failing
investment is also a failing customer; and (3) the means of intervention,
allowing for both exit and voice.
The point of the inquiry in this Part is not to prove foreign superiority, but
(1) to suggest where to look for their strengths; and (2) to see that there is a
prima facie case that their debilities-perhaps they will be slow-moving when
down-sizing is warranted, are likely to overexpand when expansion is
undesirable, or may fail to check errant managers due to mutual protection, not
mutual checking-have some offsetting strengths that have so far enabled the
foreign systems to survive.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN STRUCTURE
Corporate structures in Germany and Japan have several common
elements, including shared authority at the top, large financial intermediaries
that hold concentrated blocks of stock, interaction of bankers and managers in
structured settings, multiple intermediaries that split the vote, and personified
shareholders. These common elements differ from American structure. And
while the structures face severe risks of stagnation, they potentially have some
hypothetical offsetting advantages in improving management, financial markets,
and industrial organization.
But hypotheses are not proof. We lack a powerful theory, backed by clear
data, showing how big blocks of stock might improve corporate performance.
Thus, the point of comparing corporate structure in Germany and Japan on the
one hand and the United States on the other is not to show that the foreign
structuie is superior. Instead, the central point of this Article is to show that
the American governance structure is not inevitable, that alternatives are
plausible, and that a flatter authority structure does not disable foreign firms.
But that is not much reason to take the next step and recommend massive legal
and economic change. A prima facie possibility is not a mandate for massive
change. Even if some foreign firms are helped, it is doubtful that all are.
198. The sale can be seen not only as a "killing" of the hostage by destroying the mutually protective
relationship, but also as a direct enforcement mechanism. The stockholders could oust the incumbent
management directly by using their stock. In the sale alternative, they oust the opportunistic firm from the
network, and leave the opportunistic managers to the perils of the market, which might then oust the
managers.
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Although we do not yet want a legal regime that requires or even encourages
American replication of the foreign corporate structures, we should want a
legal regime that permits them. Right now, we do not have one that permits
them.
A. Germany and Japan as Blueprint?
Yet rules that merely permit alternative structures might be pointless. For
reasons that are not yet obvious, the international pattern is that a nation's
large firms either all have concentrated institutional voice, or none do. The
Japanese pattern in Table Ill does not reveal diversity, and nearly all American
large firms have ownership structures like GM's in Table I1.199 Economic
deduction suggests that firms that would benefit from concentrated ownership
by financial intermediaries would have it while firms that would not benefit
from such ownership would have scattered ownership. 200 But the
international results-either all one way or all the other-suggest that a slight
tilt in the power of intermediaries in either direction leads to concentrated
voting or its absence. A nation might not be able to reap the gains from greater
institutional voice where it works well without suffering losses where it
detracts from performance-one more reason why this dimension for corporate
governance reform may be a dead end.
Institutional influence here will not come primarily from banks, as it does
abroad. As such, while we can make a case for tearing down the highest
barriers to institutional involvement, I doubt that banking laws will be the
center of such reform. Moreover, the political economy of American banking
makes 'reform hard. There are ample reasons in favor of interstate branching,
and remarkably few against it, but proposals to repeal the McFadden Act thus
far have failed, largely because small-town, independent bankers form a
powerful lobby. Second, because they have a highly leveraged structure, even
unregulated banks will not become major direct equity players. 20 ' To do so
they would need at least modest direct holdings and larger holdings for others'
benefit, like the holdings of the German universal banks. But, even if
American intermediaries wanted such holdings-and the riskiness of having
them makes such an inclination unlikely-such a new complex intermediary
would require regulation that the American system cannot yet provide, and
hence American regulators must prohibit it. Third, if reform promises to
unleash bankers-an unlikely prospect-savvy managers, who were
199. See Table XIn.
200. See Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 22 (describing sorting trend among American firms). IfDemsetz
and Lehn are right, sorting is plausible even if we loosen up institutional constraints.
201. Herwig Langohr & Anthony M. Santomero, The Extent of Equity Investment by European Banks,
42 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 243 (1985). Yet the leveraging, as we saw in Part IV, may propel
successful monitoring.
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instrumental in defeating takeovers that challenged managerial autonomy,"'
might weigh in to pui bankers back on their leash. Fourth, fractional reserve
banking is a declining industry-not the place to look to for future growth.' 3
Fifth, the path-dependent development of American banks makes them ill-
equipped for the tasks of governance. German and Japanese banks "grew up"
in the boardrooms (or Presidents' Councils) of their nations' industry;
American bankers did not.
In deciding questions of bank size and solvency, we should not-and will
not-give much weight to corporate governance issues. Bank solvency is too
important. America's extensive deposit insurance (and the too-big-to-fail
doctrine) makes banks and stock a volatile mixture. The biggest risk of
unleashing American banks is less that they will disable industry than that they
will disable themselves and pass these risks onto the public through deposit
insurance. Reforming deposit insurance, however, has thus far proven to be
nearly intractable-again, small banks have too much power. The Brady
reforms were killed shortly after they were announced, 2°4 and Congress has
done little to limit deposit insurance.2 5 Congress' new effort to control the
impulse to pay uninsured depositors at banks that are "too big to fail" is
untested. Since we cannot unleash banks at the same time that we have
unleashed deposit insurance, a plausible beginning might be to allow bank
stock ownership, but only with very high capital requirements, which may
make banks' participation in corporate governance merely aspirational for the
foreseeable future.
The historical path of America's weak banking system may mean that
close relations between America's largest banks and industrial firms are
unlikely to develop. Evolution from today might take another path, however.
The Federal Reserve could and should revoke its passivity promulgations;
202. Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND LEVERAGED
BuYOUTS MEAN FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 321 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993).
203. Steven Lipin, Bank Industry Seen Shrinking in 1990s, Survey of Executives, Regulators Finds,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1991, at A14. Some of the problems facing the foreign banks partly arise from the
pressure on fractional reserve banking all over the world.
204. Ann Devroy & Kathleen Day, Deposit Fee Draws Wave of Protest, VASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1989,
at Al.
205. The FDIC Improvement Act, which requires risk-based premiums by 1995, limits payments above
the explicit insurance ceiling, and encourages regulatory intervention prior to insolvency, may seem to
reduce the impact of congressional failure to deal with the core problem of a high ($100,000) insured
amount. FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). But we have yet to see how successful these reforms will be. Moreover, we do not
yet have reason to believe that regulators will be able to act swiftly and effectively. America's procedural
system could hinder even highly capable regulators. And America's political system allows affected banks
to appeal to politicians to stop the regulators. See, e.g., Perspective-S&L Scandal, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9,
1988, at 26 (Speaker of the House Wright collected campaign contributions from the S&L and real estate
lobbies, and delayed closing down insolvent S&L's). Furthermore, new efforts to control the impulse to
pay uninsured depositors of banks "too big to fail" are untested. FDICIA § 141 (a)(1)(C) (1991), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(c)(4)(E) (1988). Hence, I would rather see the system work effectively before we undertake serious
deposit insurance risks, than to assume that shutdown reform will work and therefore the risks are
manageable.
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Congress could and should remove the 5% lid on holding company stock
ownership and should instead tie stock ownership to holding company capital.
Although few money-center banks are in a position to take advantage of these
changes, many regional banks are in good shape206 and may take advantage
of the new opportunities to become more involved with the governance of
medium-sized companies, and some of these firms will grow to become
America's largest companies.
Because American banks do not, and will not for the foreseeable future,
directly hold big blocks of stock in America's largest firms, the focus of
American reform will be pensions, mutual funds, insurers, and securities
markets, not banks. Thus, the lessons from abroad-where bankers are
primary-are at best general and superficial. 207 Blueprints for American
reform will come from studying America's pensions, mutual funds, insurers,
boardrooms, and securities markets, not from studying the German or Japanese
bank-centered system.
B. Path Dependence and the Futility of Legal Change?
Nor is it clear that legal change will lead to structural change. Path
dependence makes it hard to sort out what the "natural" result is: America
suppressed powerful intermediaries, but Germany and Japan not only permitted
them, but sometimes encouraged them. During World War II, the Japanese
War Ministry required munitions manufacturers to choose a main bank; after
German unification in the nineteenth century, the German state encouraged
bank power and, perhaps accidentally, pushed custodial stock into the hands
of the large banks. While banker stock ownership may well have been
ancillary to the encouragement of bank power in both nations, it happened.
And conceivably even were regulation in Germany, Japan, and the United
States now made to be identical, the path-dependent prevailing structures in
each-bank weakness here, and bank power abroad-would continue.
First, the social gains from involvement are probably not large. Other
mechanisms substitute, albeit imperfectly, for large shareholders in the
boardroom. Second, due to free rider effects, the private gains are even less
than the social gains. The institution cannot capture all gains, and the
transaction costs of transformation could exceed the private gains to a 5%
stockholder. Third, complex institutions are shaped by their history. For
example, American large life insurers were barred from buying any common
stock for most of this century. Yet, even with new-found permissions after
206. See, e.g., Saul Hansell, Despite Sharply Different Styles, NCNB, First Union and Wachovia Have
Driven Each Other Into the Top Tier of U.S. Banking, INST. INVESTOR, Nov. 1991, at 101 (discussing
regional branching of three of America's largest banks).
207. Some of these other institutions, such as pensions, are tied to banks, which sometimes manage
pensions.
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1984, they lack the big investments that insurers have in Germany, Japan, and
Great Britain.
Britain is another example of path dependence reducing the impact of legal
change. It has had a history of partial restrictions: (1) British banking law
precluded banks from making long-term investments in the nineteenth century
and early twentieth century; 208 (2) British banks could own stock in the
twentieth century, but needed the Bank of England's permission, which until
1980 the Bank would not give;209 (3) life insurers faced informal limits,
usually precluding ownership of more than 2% of an industrial firm; 210 and
(4) during Britain's pre-Thatcher socialist era from the 1950's until 1979
investment managers, when taking large and visible positions in industry, had
reason to fear nationalization.2 '
Thus, to understand Britain one must discount bankers and insurers due to
informal historical constraints (common in England and frustrating to research)
and a socialist system (until 1979) that nationalized large enterprises. These
partial restrictions have eroded and British ownership of large firms is
moderately concentrated.212 British institutions, particularly insurers, exercise
some voice, although less than the current legal limits would allow, and
certainly less than their German and Japanese bank cousins.213 The British
insurers' greater voice and concentration indicate that restrictions and their
history matter; however, the fact that the British institutions have not adopted
a German or Japanese structure suggests that their developmental path makes
massive structural change difficult, or at least that factors beyond economics,
law, and politics, must be added to complete our understanding of corporate
structure. Law's historical effect on intermediaries may be less that of a dam
that keeps intermediaries and firms apart than that of a blockage that diverts
the intermediaries into another path.
208. Tilly, supra note 141, at 196-98.
209. Christine M. Cumming & Lawrence M. Sweet, Financial Structure of the G-1O Countries: How
Does the United States Compare?, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. Q. REV., Winter 1987-88, at 14, 15; Loretta
J. Mester, Banking and Commerce: A Dangerous Liaison?, FED. RESERVE BANK PHIL. BULL., May/June
1992, at 17, 21.
210. LAWRENCE D. JONES, INVESTMENT POLICIES OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 103 n.74 (1968).
211. Cf. HARGREAVES PARKINSON, OWNERSHIP OF INDUSTRY 1-2, 52-53, 102-104 (1951) (examining
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C. The Paradox of International Competition: Solution and Problem
Managers are situated in several markets and organizations. The internal
organization of the boardroom and its relationship with institutional
shareholders is only one. Professional pride of managers and directors makes
them try hard even if the organizational constraints acting on them are weak.
Embarrassment from media attention will help correct the most egregious
errors. Product markets, capital markets, managerial labor markets, employee
labor markets, and corporate takeover markets constrain managers. This is all
another way of saying that corporate governance is only one dimension of
competition.
Until recent decades, large-scale American industry had two critical
complementary advantages over much industry abroad: scale economies and
competitive structure. The American market was (and is still today) so large
that it could support two or three firms, and hence workable competition, at
the highest economies of scale in even the heaviest of industries; no other
market in the world could do both. Economies of scale in a small nation meant
monopoly; competition often meant inefficient scale. America could get both
scale and competition; so, if some details in organization at the top and in the
boardroom were not for the best, no matter, because scale and competition
were so important and might allow for profits that would hide a few defects
in organization.
These advantages are no longer exclusively America's. A common market
in Europe and a globalized marketplace allow foreign firms scale economies
in a competitive market. Details that were once trivial-like corporate
governance-become noticed in the 1990's. Stress from international
competition reveals weaknesses in some American firms, presses American
firms to change, and makes us wonder whether international competition is not
just among firms, but also among forms of organization. z 4 The existence,
persistence, and until recently, the success, of some rival foreign firms make
us question whether the American system is as sound in all dimensions as we
have thought.
Competition also partly substitutes for effective corporate governance.
Successful foreign firms compete with American firms, pressing badly
governed American firms to change or to lose market share. Response to the
stimulus of product market competition generally induces American firms to
be more productive; corporate governance becomes secondary, relevant only
to how (and if) it facilitates change inside the firm.
214. In this sense, international competition mirrors Tiebout's model of state competition as a means
of providing efficient regulation. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 419-20 (1956).
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There is another response that American firms might have to the stimulus
of competition, other than to improve. In industries with long-lived capital
resources, poorly governed, poorly performing firms may stagger along, as
have steel and auto firms, wasting fixed assets without really improving
enough. Troubled firms may also respond with political action to reduce
competition-lobbying for quotas and tariffs-as have steel and auto firms.
CONCLUSION
The American-style large firm, with managers at a powerful pinnacle in
the hierarchy, is not inevitable. Managers could share authority with
intermediaries holding large blocks of stock as they do in Germany and Japan.
These foreign differences contradict parts of prevailing corporate theory, which
explains key features of the firm as reactions to the principal-agent problems
that arise when the firm, to reach economies of scale, sought large inputs of
capital from thousands of far-flung investors demanding diversification. As
investors became more fragmented, power inside the firm shifted from the
shareholders to the managers. While these capital-raising and principal-agent
problems are universal, the resulting corporate structures are not; institutional
arrangements other than those prevailing in America are possible, and do exist.
There is more than one way to move savings to industry-the American
way, via weak intermediaries in a well-developed securities market is only one.
Another is via strong intermediaries, like those in Germany and Japan, which
not only move funds to firms, but also share power with managers. The
strength of financial intermediaries is a product not just of economic evolution,
but of history, politics, and culture. As I have argued before, American politics
induced laws that fragmented institutions, their portfolios, and their ability to
cooperate, precluding the institutional alternative. In Germany and Japan, the
ownership structures are different, the corporate structures in which CEO's are
embedded are different, the financial institutions are different, and the rules
governing financial intermediaries are different. The foreign relationships
would be illegal here. We will never know for sure whether American banks
would have developed differently without the restraints. We do know that
American-style restraints would have been sufficient to stymie banks from
foreign-style involvement in corporate governance.
The classical model could be modified in two ways. One would be to scale
it back, by conceding that financial rules condition the way corporations grow,
so that the American features are the best contractual arrangements available
given the restraints. The other way to modify the economic model would be
to expand it by arguing that ownership in Germany and Japan will fragment,
due to the inevitable economic imperatives of organizing financial
intermediaries. Inevitable fragmentation may yet become a true prediction, but
it is now only a prediction, not a fact. In Germany, concentrated institutional
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ownership has been increasing, not decreasing, and new alliances that imitate
keiretsu relationships belie fragmentation. And Japanese concentrated
ownership has been rock-solid for twenty-five years, despite enormous pressure
on the banks. Newly-rising, large Japanese firms have adopted the old
concentrated ownership, not shunned it.
Political forces in Germany and Japan influence intermediaries and
corporate structures, although the forces have been different. Germany's statist
policies concentrated banking at the end of the nineteenth century. Later
pressures produced codetermination, which is hardly apolitical and created a
very different corporate structure than that which prevails in America. Along
with German populism, it induces some banker disengagement today. Japanese
regulatory politics concentrated Japanese banking, separated banking from
securities, and then forced savers and firms to meet in the banking channel.
Today, the Japanese system is under stress, but interest group infighting
between bankers and brokers stymies full reconstruction of the financial
system.
Firms in nations that historically tolerated or encouraged large pools of
private economic power evolve differently than do firms in nations that
repeatedly fragment financial institutions, their portfolios, and their ability to
network blocks of stock. Thus, some of today's incipient fragmentation abroad
can be traced to political influences. Moreover, the current economic turmoil
in both Germany and Japan makes us wonder whether there will be economic
losers associated with the large firm-employees or managers or both-and
whether they will appeal to their legislature to re-do the economic result in
ways that affect intermediaries and the structure of the large firm, replaying the
American political influences that created the American large firm.
Differences do not imply superiority. Labor, regulatory, or cultural
differences could explain good performance with the differences in corporate
governance spurious. Although corporate differences suggest the importance
of asking whether institutional voice can improve firm governance, the
evidence of foreign superiority is thus far scant. The inquiry here is by no
means the final word; we have only begun to scratch the surface of
comparative corporate governance. The direction for the future, I believe, is to
understand more than just how different structures could make managers more
accountable, but also to see whether institutional voice could address
informational defects in securities markets and defects in organization,
including industrial organization, labor organization, and the psychology of
top-level decisionmaking.
Even if we had more data, the foreign systems would yield no blueprint,
because bankers, the protagonists abroad, are not likely to be the key active
investors here. Other financial institutions will have to be the source of
institutional voice in America, and we cannot get detailed blueprints for them
from abroad. While there may be some value to removing the impediments to
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institutional organization, we have little reason to copy the foreign banking
systems' details.
This analysis demands a broadening of the corporate academic agenda.
Rather than using agency costs or contract theory or judicial doctrine to
explain this or that feature as mitigating or reflecting managerial deviation
from the maximization of shareholders' wealth, we must consider the role of
politics, history, and culture. I lack the deep knowledge of German and
Japanese law, corporate structure, history, and politics needed for a definitive
interpretation. Although others will have to extend my analysis, the evidence
now available casts doubt on the economic model as a full explanation for the
Berle-Means corporation. The key lesson is that the prevailing economic model
cannot completely explain corporate forms abroad.
Thus, I examine Germany and Japan not to argue that their corporate
structures are better and should be mimicked, but to show that different
structures are possible; that the American pattern of fragmented shareholders
with little power is not inevitable; that managers can share power with
intermediaries without making the corporate world fall apart; and that corporate
structure is highly sensitive to the organization of financial intermediaries,
while the organization of intermediaries is highly sensitive to a nation's
politics.
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APPENDIX
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TABLE VIII. Percentage of Stock of Largest German Corporations
Held Directly by German Banks216
Rank and Name Name of Bank Percent of








35. Kaufhof AG (1986)
38. Degussa AG




58. Klockner Werke AG
67. Hochtief AG
71. Kldckner-Humboldt AG
75. Philipp Holzmann AG
































































Source: DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, supra note 16, at 202-06.
215. Tables I-VII are in the text.




TABLE IX. Relative Size of German, Japanese,
and American Banking Sectors
Assets of German Banking Sector
German GNP
Assets of Japanese Banking Sector
Japanese GNP











Source: MONTHLY REP. DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, Feb. 1991, at 4 (size of
German banking system); Memorandum from Bank of Japan to Mark Roe
(Aug. 13, 1991) (on file with author) (size of Japanese banking system); FED.
RESERVE BANK N.Y. BULL., June 1991, at A18 (size of American banking
system).
The German and Japanese banking sectors are about two or three times
larger than the American, although the largest German and Japanese banks are
approximately five times larger than the largest American banks. The relative
weakness of the American banking sector accounts for roughly half of the
relatively small size of American banks.
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TABLE X. Relative Size of Largest Bank and Largest Firm in Germany,
Japan and America
Assets of largest German Bank - $267B =
Assets of largest German Automaker $49B
Assets of largest Japanese Bank Y435B =
Assets of largest Japanese Automaker ¥55B
Assets of largest American Bank $216B 1.2
Assets of largest American Automaker $180B
Source: Bank Data from Table V; Automaker Data from WORLDSCOPE (W/D
Partners, ed., 1990), available in NEXIS, Compny library, Wldscp file
(Toyota's assets are at June 30, 1990; all others are at December 31, 1990.).
This relationship shows the relative ability of a nation's largest bank to
control a large portion of the capitalization of the largest industrial company.
We see that American banks are not as able to control large pieces of the
largest firms, and there would be concern that the American banks would be
poorly diversified if they did. The largest German and Japanese banks, in
contrast, are able to control larger pieces of the largest industrial companies
without committing as much (as a percentage) of their assets and equity as
would be required of an analogous American bank.
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TABLE XIII. Ownership (Voting) Structure for Three Typical
American Large Public Firms (1990)
Source: Brancato et al., supra note 10.
Exxon IBM General Electric
Institutional Percent of Institutional Percent of Instutional Percent of
Manager Shares Manager Shares Manager Shares
CREF 1.09 Wells Fargo 1.07 Wells Fargo 1.09
Wells Fargo 1.05 Mich. St. Treas. 1.04 Bankers Trust NY 1.02
BankersTrust NY 1.01 Bankers Trust NY 1.01 CREF .99
NY St. Common Ret. .88 NY St. Common Ret. .83 Mellon Bank .91
Mellon Bank .73 Mellon Bank .76 NY St. Common Ret. .88
Top 5 Shareholders 4.76 4.70 4.89
Top 25 Shareholders 11.47 13.54 12.89
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